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Abstract
We introduce an arbitrage-free framework for robust valuation adjustments. An investor trades
a credit default swap portfolio with a risky counterparty, and hedges credit risk by taking a position
in defaultable bonds. The investor does not know the return rate of her counterparty bond, but
is confident that it lies within a uncertainty interval. We derive both upper and lower bounds
for the XVA process of the portfolio, and show that these bounds may be recovered as solutions
of nonlinear ordinary differential equations. The presence of collateralization and closeout payoffs
leads to important differences with respect to classical credit risk valuation. The value of the super-
replicating portfolio cannot be directly obtained by plugging one of the extremes of the uncertainty
interval in the valuation equation, but rather depends on the relation between the XVA replicating
portfolio and the close-out value throughout the life of the transaction. Our comparative statics
analysis indicates that credit contagion has a nonlinear effect on the replication strategies and on
the XVA.
Keywords: robust XVA, counterparty credit risk, backward stochastic differential equation,
arbitrage-free valuation.
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1 Introduction
Dealers need to account for market inefficiencies related to funding and credit valuation adjustments
when marking their swap books. Those include the capital needed to support the trading position, the
losses originating in case of a premature default by either of the trading parties, and the remuneration
of funding and collateral accounts. It is common market practice to refer to these costs as the XVA of
the trade. Starting from 2011, major dealer banks have started to mark these valuation adjustments
on their balance sheets; see, for instance, Cameron (2014) and Beker (2015).
A large body of literature has studied the implication of these costs on the valuation and hedging
of derivatives positions. Crépey (2015a) and Crépey (2015b) use backward stochastic differential
equations to value the transaction, accounting for funding constraints and separating between positive
and negative cash flows which need to be remunerated at different interest rates. Brigo and Pallavicini
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(2014) postulate the existence of a risk-neutral pricing measure, and obtain a valuation equation
which accounts for counterparty credit risk, funding, and collateral servicing costs. Bielecki and
Rutkowski (2014) construct a semimartingale framework and provide a backward stochastic differential
equation (BSDE) representation for the wealth process that replicates a default-free claim, assuming
the trading parties to be default-free. Building on Bielecki and Rutkowski (2014), Nie and Rutkowski
(2018) study pricing of contracts both from the perspective of the investor and her counterparty,
and provide the range of fair bilateral prices. The default risk of the trading parties involved in
the transaction is accounted for by Burgard and Kjaer (2011b), who derive the partial differential
equation representations for the derivative value using replication arguments. Andersen et al. (2019)
view funding costs from a corporate finance perspective. They develop a model that is consistent with
asset pricing theories, and importantly account for the impact of funding strategies on the market
valuation of the claim. We refer to Crépey et al. (2014) for an overview of the literature on valuation
adjustments.
We consider a market environment, in which an investor transacts credit default swaps with a
counterparty and wants to compute the XVA of her trading position. The trading inefficiencies con-
tributing to the XVA include funding costs due to the difference between treasury borrowing and
lending rates, losses originating from premature default of the investor or her counterparty, and costs
of posting initial and variation margin collateral. Existing literature on valuation adjustments for
credit default swaps has focused on credit and debit valuation adjustments using reduced form models
(e.g. Brigo et al. (2014)), structural credit models (e.g. Lipton and Sepp (2009)), and Markov models
based on dynamic copulas to account for wrong-way risk (Bielecki et al. (2012)). These works neither
account for the additional costs of funding, nor for model uncertainty.
The distinguishing feature of our framework, relative to the literature surveyed above, is that the
investor is uncertain about the rate of return of the counterparty bond used to hedge counterparty
credit risk, and we compute a robust pricing for the underlying credit default swap portfolio.1 A
recent work by Fadina and Schmidt (2018) develops a framework that incorporates model uncertainty
into defaultable term structure models. They assume lower and upper bounds for the default intensity
and construct uncertainty intervals for the defaultable bond prices, ignoring valuation adjustments.
Our theory parallels that for uncertain volatility introduced by Avellaneda et al. (1995). Therein, the
authors consider a Black-Scholes type model, in which the volatility of the underlying asset is unknown
and only a priori deterministic bounds for its value are prescribed. They derive the Black-Scholes-
Barenblatt equation characterizing the value of European options in this model; see also Lyons (1995)
for the case of one-dimensional barrier options. Fouque and Ning (2017) generalize the analysis to the
case that the volatility fluctuates between two stochastic bounds, arguing that this better captures
the behavior of options with longer maturity. Other related works include Hobson (1998), El Karoui
et al. (2009), and Denis and Martini (2006) who provide a probabilistic description using the theory
of capacities.
We focus on the impact that uncertainty on the return of the counterparty account has on the
valuation of the trade, and compute upper and lower bounds for the XVA. There are both similarities
and differences between our setup and the uncertain volatility setup of Avellaneda et al. (1995). On
the one hand, the differential equations yielding the robust XVA are ordinary and of first order, as
opposed in uncertain volatility where the price bounds are obtained by solving second-order partial
1 Several studies have investigated the determinants of bond returns, including default risk and market liquidity.
Acharya et al. (2013) bucket the bonds into rating classes, ranging from AAA through CCC. They show that the
economic contribution of interest rate and default risks to bond returns is larger than the contribution of liquidity under
both stressed and normal market regimes.
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differential equations. Additional simplifications arise in our framework because we do not need to
deal with the singularity of probability measures. On the other hand, new technical challenges appear
due to the complex relationship between the valuation of the replicating portfolio, the determination
of collateral levels, and the close-out requirements of the valuation party.
In our framework, the investor uses her defaultable bond, the bond of her counterparty, and the
bond of reference entities in the CDS portfolio to replicate the XVA process associated with the credit
default swaps portfolio.2 We conduct the analysis in the paper using defaultable (money market)
accounts as opposed to bonds, because the value processes of those accounts are continuous up to
the firm’s default. In contrast, the bond price of a firm may jump if another firm in the portfolio
defaults, introducing nontrivial technical challenges. We show in Remark 3.3 that there exists a one-
to-one relation between defaultable bonds and defaultable accounts, hence our choice of working with
defaultable accounts comes without any loss of generality.
We derive the nonlinear valuation equation that takes into account counterparty credit risk and
closeout payoffs exchanged at default. Our valuation equation is a special BSDE driven by Lévy
processes, that contains jump-to-default but no diffusion terms. We characterize the super-replicating
price of the transaction as the solution to a nonlinear system of ODEs that is obtained from the
nonlinear BSDE tracking the XVA process, after projecting such as BSDE onto the smaller filtration
exclusive of credit events information. The system consists of an ODE, whose solution is the value of
the transaction cash flows ignoring market inefficiencies, and additional ODEs that yield the XVA of
the portfolio. Intuitively, the super-replicating price is the value attributed to the trade by an investor
who positions herself in the worst possible economic scenario.
We find that the super-replicating price and the corresponding super-replicating strategies may
not be recovered by simply plugging one of the extremes of the uncertainty interval into the valuation
equation. Our analysis indicates that, depending on the relation between the current value of the
XVA replicating portfolio and the close-out value of the transaction, the lower or upper extreme of the
uncertainty interval on the counterparty account rate should be used in the super-replication strategy.
The trader wants to be robust against the most negative outcome, and therefore will choose the
extreme of the interval that minimizes the instantaneous change in the value of the position. This will
in turn require the investor to initially hold the maximal wealth to implement this replicating strategy,
hence leading to the maximum initial value of the portfolio. As long as the portfolio replicates the
trade at the terminal time, its initial value provides an upper bound on the value of the XVA. For
example, if the strategy replicating the XVA requires, at a given time, the investor to be short the
counterparty’s defaultable account, i.e., a positive jump would arise at the counterparty default (this
would be the case if the value of the XVA replicating portfolio lies below the close-out value), then the
trader would choose to use the upper extreme of the uncertainty interval, because this corresponds to
the maximal default intensity and thus minimizes the instantaneous change in value. As the required
replicating position may switch from short to long and vice versa several times before the close-out
time, the extreme of the default interval used in the valuation of the superreplicating strategy will
change, too.
We perform a comparative statics analysis to quantify the dependence of the XVA and its repli-
cation strategy on portfolio credit risk and default contagion. We use a model of direct contagion, in
which default intensities of reference entities, investor, and counterparty are piecewise constant and
only jump when one of these firms default. Our analysis finds that if the default intensity of the
2The replication approach to XVA has also been adopted in other studies, including Crépey et al. (2014) and Burgard
and Kjaer (2011b, 2013).
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investor’s counterparty increases, either due to idiosyncratic motives or to contagion effects triggered
by the default a reference entity in the portfolio, the XVA decreases in absolute value. This is because,
under these circumstances, the investor needs to replicate the underlying portfolio transaction for a
smaller period of time, and thus incurs smaller financing costs. As direct contagion increases, defaults
tend to cluster and amplify the impact of portfolio credit risk on the default intensity of investor and
her counterparty. The financing costs of the replication strategy get lower, and a payer CDS investor
needs to use a larger number of shares of her defaultable account to replicate the jump to closeout at
her default time, compared with the number of shares of her counterparty defaultable account needed
to replicate the jump to closeout at her counterparty’s default time. This is because if the investor
(who is replicating her long portfolio position) defaults, then she needs to replicate a larger jump to
closeout if the portfolio credit risk is higher and thus her moneyness increases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We develop the market model in Section 2. We
introduce the valuation measure, collateral process and close-out valuation in Section 3. We introduce
the replicating wealth process and the notion of arbitrage in Section 4. We develop a robust analysis
of the XVA process in Section 5. Section 6 presents a numerical analysis of XVA and its replication
strategies on a multi-name portfolio. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
Our framework builds on that proposed by Bichuch et al. (2017) in that it uses a reduced form model
of defaults and maintains the distinction between universal and investor specific instruments. The
model economy consists of N firms, indexed by i = 1, . . . , N , whose default events constitute the
sources of risks in the portfolio. We use I and C to denote, respectively, the trader (also referred to
as investor throughout the paper) executing the transaction and her counterparty. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a
probability space rich enough to support the following constructions. We assume the existence of N+2
independent and identically distributed unit mean exponential random variables Ei, i = 1, . . . , N, I, C.
The default time of each firm i is defined to be the first time its cumulated intensity process exceeds
the corresponding exponentially distributed random variable, i.e., τi = sup
{
t ≥ 0: ∫ t0 hPi (s)ds > Ei}.
Accordingly, we use the default indicator process Hi(t) = 1l{τi≤t}, t ≥ 0, to track the occurrence of
firm i’s default. The background filtration F :=
(Ft)t≥0, where Ft := σ(Hj(u);u ≤ t : j ∈ {1, .., N}),
contains information about the risk of the portfolio, i.e., of the default of the N firms referencing the
traded securities, but not about the defaults of the investor I and her counterparty C. The default
intensity processes
(
hPi (t)
)
t≥0, i ∈ {1, ..., N, I, C}, are constructed so that they are adapted to the
background filtration F, i.e., the default intensity at a given time t depends on the firms’ defaults
occurring before time t. To achieve this, we use the following stepwise procedure: Assume hP,0i (t) ∈
F0⊗B([0, t)) and define τ0i := sup
{
t ≥ 0: ∫ t0 hP,0i (s)ds > Ei}. Then, we can define F1t := σ(Hj(u);u ≤
t∧ τ0(1) : j ∈ {1, .., N}
)
, where τ0(1) is the time of the first default (the first order statistics). For k ≥ 1,
choose h˜P,ki (t) ∈ Fkt ⊗B([0, t)) and define recursively hP,ki (t) := hP,k−1i (t)1l[0,τk−1(k) )(t)+h˜
P,k
i (t)1l[τk−1(k) ,∞)(t),
where we use the notation τk(i) to denote the i-th order statistics of the k-level stopping time τki . Then
we define τki := sup
{
t ≥ 0: ∫ t0 hP,ki (s)ds > Ei} as well as Fk+1t := σ(Hj(u);u ≤ t∧τk(k+1) : j ∈ {1, .., N})
for k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. In this way, the intensity hP,ki agrees with hP,k−1i up to the k-th default, but
accounts for information after the k-th default thereafter. Finally, we define the full filtration F as
F =
(FN+1t )t≥0.
We denote the filtration containing information about the investor and counterparty defaults by
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H =
(Ht)t≥0, where Ht = σ(Hj(u);u ≤ t : j ∈ {I, C}). By construction, the default intensities
hPi , i ∈ {1, .., N, I, C}, are piecewise deterministic functions of time (we thus work in the framework
of piecewise-deterministic Markov processes, see Davis (1984)). We furthermore require that they are
piecewise continuous and uniformly bounded. The enlarged filtration, including both portfolio risk
(default events of the N firms referencing portfolio securities) and counterparty risk (default events
of investor and her counterparty), is denoted by G =
(Gt)t≥0 = (Ft ∨ Ht)t≥0. We will consider the
augmented filtrations, i.e., the smallest complete and right-continuous filtrations encompassing the
natural filtrations, and denote them by F, H, G (with a slight abuse of notation). For future purposes,
we define the martingale compensator processes $i,P of Hi as
$i,P(t) := Hi(t)−
∫ t
0
(
1−Hi(s)
)
hPi (s) ds, i ∈ {1, . . . , N, I, C}.
By construction, these compensator processes are F-martingales for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and G-martingales
for i ∈ {1, . . . , N, I, C}.
The defaultable account rates of all firms in the portfolio and of the investor are known to all
market participants. The trader, however, only has limited information about the actual rate of the
counterparty defaultable account, and in particular only knows its upper and lower bound.
Replicating instruments The goal of the investor is to replicate a portfolio of credit default swaps
(CDS) written on N different reference entities, denoted by 1, 2, . . . , N . All CDSs are assumed to
mature at the same time T . The credit risk exposure associated with this portfolio is replicated using
both universal and investor specific instruments. The universal instruments are available to all market
participants, while the investor specific instruments are accessible solely to the investor and not to
other market participants. The universal instruments include (defaultable) bonds underwritten by the
reference entities in the credit default swaps portfolio as well as by the trader and her counterparty.
As opposed to modeling defaultable bonds directly, we model the defaultable accounts associated
with investor, counterparty, and reference entities in the CDS portfolio. These securities are typically
employed as numeraires until they default, and are used to define the survival measures. For instance,
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2004) study a survival spot measure where the numeraire is a defaultable
account. We provide more details on the relationship between defaultable bonds and defaultable
accounts in Remark 3.3.
Under the physical measure P, for i ∈ {1, . . . , N, I, C}, and 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the dynamics of the
defaultable account processes with zero recovery at default are given by
dBi(t) = µiBi(t) dt−Bi(t−) dHi(t), Bi(0) = 1,
where
(
µi(t)
)
, i ∈ {1, . . . , N, I, C}, are F-adapted and thus piecewise deterministic processes, po-
tentially jumping at discrete times corresponding to default events. We assume that the rates µi,
i ∈ {1, . . . , N, I} are observable while the investor has no further information about µC except for that
it is constrained to lie in the interval [µ
C
, µC ].
The investor specific instruments include her funding and collateral accounts. We assume that the
investor lends and borrows from her treasury desk at, possibly different, rates r+f (the lending rate)
and r−f (the borrowing rate). Denote by B
r±
f the cash accounts corresponding to these funding rates.
An investment strategy of ξf := (ξf (s); s ≥ 0) shares in the funding account yields an account value
Brf := (Brf (s); s ≥ 0) given by
Brf (t) := Brf (t)
(
ξf ) = e
∫ t
0 rf (ξ
f (s))ds,
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where
rf := rf (y) = r−f 1l{y<0} + r
+
f 1l{y>0}.
Collateral The trader and the counterparty use a collateral account to mitigate counterparty risk.
Following the standards set by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the In-
ternational Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (see BIS Margin (2013)), the collateral
consists of variation margins, tracking the changes in market value of the traded portfolio and denoted
by VM , and initial margins that are used to mitigate the gap risk at the close-out of the transaction
and denoted by IM .3. The European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) posits at least daily
updates for variation margins and requires a revaluation of initial margins at least every ten days (see
EMIR OTC Regulation (2016)). In the United States, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
requires daily updates on initial margins (CFTC Margin Requirements (2016)). Mathematically, the
collateral process M := (Mt; t ≥ 0), M = VM + IM , is an F adapted stochastic process which we
assume to be positive if the investor posts collateral (is collateral provider) and negative if she receives
collateral (is the collateral taker).
Denote by r+m the interest rate on collateral demanded by the investor when she posts to her
counterparty, and by r−m the rate on collateral demanded by the counterparty when the investor is the
collateral taker. The value of the collateral account at time t is then given by
Brm(t) = e
∫ t
0 rm(Ms)ds,
where
rm := rm(x) = r−m1l{x<0} + r+m1l{x>0}.
Denoting by ψmt the number of shares of collateral account Brmt held by the trader at time t, we
have the following relation
ψm(t)Brm(t) = −Mt. (1)
The collateral amount Mt received or posted at time t will be determined by a valuation party, as
discussed in the next section. Figure 1 describes the mechanics of the entire flow of transactions.
3 Valuation Measure, Collateralization and Close-out
We take the perspective of a trader who purchases a portfolio of credit default swaps, and determine
its value by constructing a replicating portfolio. Such a portfolio accumulates spread payments, and
is worth the loss rate at the default of any reference entity. The wealth process associated with
the portfolio uses defaultable accounts of the underlying reference entities to replicate the market
risk of the transaction, and defaultable accounts of the trading parties to replicate the counterparty
risk of investor and of her counterparty. Hence, from a corporate perspective, we are interested in
the entrance price of the transaction. Because the trader does not know the exact default intensity
of her counterparty, such a replication argument can only provide price bounds. In particular, the
lower bound provides a reliable benchmark to measure the potential losses incurred if the portfolio is
acquired at a higher price.
3Notice that initial margins are updated on a regular basis (not just posted once at the inception of the trade as the
name might suggest), as it is the case for variation margins. Variation margins are usually updated at a higher frequency
(intraday or at most daily) than initial margins, which are resettled daily or even at lower frequency
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Figure 1: Trading: Solid lines are purchases/sales, dashed lines borrowing/lending, dotted lines interest
due; blue lines are cash, and black lines are defaultable account purchases for cash. Note the difference
between the two-sided variation margin and the initial margin that is kept in a segregated account.
Remark 3.1. The trader aims to compute the difference between the entrance price, i.e., the price at
which the transaction is settled, and the market value of the transaction, so that she can identify the
underlying risk factors and allocate them to different desks within the bank. This difference is referred
to as XVA.
It is important to introduce a finer distinction between the different sources of surcharges and
unreplicable risk (referred to, e.g., as CVA, FVA, KVA) to correctly allocate them to the managing
desks. Hence, when calculating the exit price, i.e., the price at which the portfolio can be liquidated
on the open market (this is relevant for tax and regulatory purposes), one needs to account for these
components at a higher level of granularity. One of these components is the KVA, defined as the
amount of capital at risk set aside by shareholders of the investor’s firm. KVA should be calculated
under the historical measure, which is typically assumed to be the same as the risk neutral measure
to preserve analytical tractability. Such an approach is followed, for example, by Albanese and Crépey
(2018) who define the KVA as the solution to a BSDE under the risk neutral measure, that accounts for
an exogenously specified hurdle rate to remunerate the investor for setting aside capital at risk. Green
el al. (2014) derive the KVA using an extension of the semi-replication approach in Burgard and Kjaer
(2011b) by grouping together all capital dependent terms in the Feynman-Kac representation of their
pricing PDE. Our analysis deals with entrance prices, i.e., prior to decomposing the trade into risk
sources and splitting it to the various desks. Nevertheless, we compute the (super)replicating price of
the transaction, which is robust against the specific choices of physical and pricing measure because the
assumed bounds for the account rates are constant, and thus independent of the choice of the measure.
From a different perspective, our analysis can be seen as providing general bounds for XVA, that in
turn yield bounds for its individual components such as KVA, which are robust to misspecification of
the counterparty’s account rate.
Next, we discuss public and private valuations. Private valuations are based on discount rates,
which depend on investor specific characteristics, while public valuations depend on publicly avail-
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able discount factors. Specifically, public valuations are needed for the determination of collateral
requirements and the close-out value of the transaction. They are determined by a valuation agent
who might be either one of the parties involved in the transaction or a third party, in accordance
with market practices reviewed by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). The
valuation agent determines the closeout value of the transaction by calculating the so-called clean
price of the derivative, using the discount rate rD and the account rates of the firms in the portfolio,
µi, i ∈ {1, . . . N} (we recall that the latter are known to the valuation agent). Throughout the paper,
we will use the superscript ∧ when referring specifically to public valuations.
The replicating process will stop before maturity if the trader or her counterparty were to default
prematurely. We thus define the terminal time of the trade (i.e., the earliest between the default time
of either party or the maturity T of the transaction) as τ := τI ∧ τC ∧ T . The valuation done by the
agent is mathematically represented as pricing the trade under the valuation measure Q associated
with the publicly available discount rate rD chosen by the agent. The measure Q is equivalent to P
and their relation is specified by the Radon-Nikodým density
dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣
Fτ∧(τ1∨...∨τN )
=
∏
i∈{1,...,N,I,C}
(
(µi − rD)(τ ∧ τi)∫ τ∧τi
0 h
P
i (s)ds
)Hi(τ∧τi)
e
∫ τ∧τi
0 (rD−µi+hPi (u))du. (2)
Remark 3.2. As the valuation measure is used to determine the clean price of the transaction, it
needs not depend on the default intensities of the investor I and her counterparty C. Nevertheless,
we have included both of these default intensities in the definition of Q because this will simplify the
exposition in later sections of the paper. In particular, we do not need to introduce a different measure
for the investor’s valuation.
The Q-dynamics of the defaultable accounts can be derived using Girsanov’s theorem and are given
by
dBi(t) = rDBi(t) dt−Bi(t−)d$Qi (t), (3)
where $Qi := ($
Q
i (t); 0 ≤ t ≤ τ ∧ τ(N)) are (F,Q)-martingales. They can be represented explicitly as
$Qi (t) = $Pi (t)+
∫ t
0
(
1−Hi(u)
)
(hPi (u)−hQi (u))du where the processes hQi = µi−rD, i ∈ {1, . . . , N, I, C},
(with µi, i ∈ {1, . . . , N, I, C}, being the rate of returns of the defaultable accounts associated with the
reference entities, trader and her counterparty), are the firms’ default intensities under the valuation
measure and assumed to be positive.
Remark 3.3. We note that under the valuation measure Q, the actual bond price processes have to
be G-martingales. Therefore, for i ∈ {1, . . . , N, I, C} and denoting by Pi the price of the defaultable
bond of firm i, we have
Pi(t)
Bi(t)
= EQ
[
Pi(T )
Bi(T )
∣∣∣∣∣Gt
]
and hence, as the bond value at maturity is equal to one, it follows that the actual bond prices are
determined from the modeled defaultable accounts via
Pi(t) = Bi(t)EQ
[ 1
Bi(T )
∣∣∣Gt].
Such a modeling approach has the advantage that the value processes of the defaultable accounts are
continuous up to default, while the actual bond prices may jump down at the time when another bond
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defaults. To see this, notice that the terminal condition of a unit notational bond that has not defaulted
is always one. If the return rate of a bond changes at the time another bond defaults, then the discount
rate used in the valuation of the surviving bond would be different, leading to a change in the bond price.
This is empirically relevant and, in quite a few cases, captures accurately the behavior of corporate
bonds (a clear example are the sovereign defaults that caused local corporate defaults in the Asia crisis).
3.1 Collateral
The public valuation process of the credit default swap portfolio, as determined by the valuation agent,
is given by
Vˆt =
N∑
i=1
ziCˆi(t),
where Cˆi(t) is the time t value of the credit default swap referencing entity i. The variables zi indicate if
the trader sold the swap to her counterparty (zi = 1) or purchased it from her counterparty (zi = −1).
In the case the swap is purchased, the trader pays the spread times the notional to her counterparty,
and receives the loss rate times the notional at the default time of the reference entity, if it occurs
before the maturity T . This is the so-called “clean price”, and does not account for credit risk of the
counterparty, collateral or funding costs. Clearly, the public valuation of the portfolio is just the sum
of the valuation of the individual CDSs.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) released a second consultative document on margin requirements
for non-centrally cleared derivatives in February, 2013; see BCBS/IOSCO (2013). Such a document
provides minimum standards for initial margin posting related to non-centrally cleared derivatives. It
highlights the importance of separating between the initial margin posted by the counterparty, and
the initial margin posted by the investor, so to avoid any netting between these two accounts and
protecting each party from gap risk. Our collateralization process is consistent with these market
practices. The variation margin is set to be a fixed ratio of the public valuation of the portfolio, while
the initial margin is designed to mitigate the gap risk and is calculated using value at risk. Such a risk
measure is set to cover a number of days of adverse price/credit spread movements for the portfolio
position with a target confidence level.4 Note that there is an important difference between initial and
variation margins. Variation margins are always directional and can be rehypotecated (i.e., it flows
from the paying party to the receiving party; the latter may use it for investment purposes), whereas
initial margins have to be posted by both parties and need to be kept in a segregated account, thus
they cannot be used for portfolio replication. Rehypothecation is a very popular practice because it
lowers the cost of collateral remuneration (Singh and Aitken (2010)) and has been accounted for by
existing literature on XVA (e.g. Brigo et al. (2012)). Moreover, we assume that collateral is posted
and received in the form of cash, which is practically the most common form of collateral.5
Thus, on the event that neither the trader nor her counterparty have defaulted by time t, and the
4Both EU and US authorities require initial margins to cover losses over a liquidation period for ten days in 99% of
all realized scenarios (EMIR OTC Regulation (2016); CFTC Margin Requirements (2016)).
5More precisely, cash is the predominant form of collateral used for variation margins, and it accounts for about 80% of
the total posted variation margin amount. Initial margins are usually delivered in the form of government securities (see,
for instance, page 7 of ISDA (2017)). Overall, the amount of variation margin posted for bilaterally cleared derivatives
contracts was about $ 173 billion in 2017, whereas the variation margin accounted for $870 billions (see page 1 therein).
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reference entities in the portfolio have not all defaulted, the collateral process is defined as
Mt := IMt + VMt =
(
β
(
V aRq(Vˆ(t+δ)∧T − Vˆt | τ ∧ τ(N) > t)
)+
+ αVˆt
)
1l{τ∧τ(N)>t}, (4)
where for a real number x we are using the notation x+ = max(x, 0). In the above expression,
0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is the collateralization level, δ > 0 is the delay in collateral posting, q is the level of
risk tolerance and β is stress factor. The case α = 0 corresponds to zero collateralization, while
α = 1 means that the transaction is fully collateralized. The positive part of the value at risk quantity
captures the fact that initial margins cannot be re-hypothecated. Hence, the wealth process associated
with the investor’s trading strategy does not include received initial margins.
3.2 Close-out value of transaction
We follow the risk-free closeout convention in the case of default by the trader or her counterparty.
According to this convention, each party liquidates the position at the market value when the other
trading counterparty defaults. Hence, the value of the replicating portfolio will coincide with the
third party valuation if the amount of available collateral is sufficient to absorb all occurred losses.
If this is not the case, the trader will only receive a recovery fraction of her residual position, i.e.,
after netting losses with the available collateral. Note that, in practice, the settlement at the third
party valuation takes some time. This induces gap risk because the value of the transaction typically
fluctuates between the actual default time and the settlement time (see Brigo and Pallavicini (2014)).
While superhedging of the actual settlement price (including gap risk) is not possible, our approach
aims at finding a superhedge of the market valuation at default time. Initial margins act as a cushion
against gap risk, and are computed using a tail risk measure. Let us denote by θ the value of the
replicating portfolio at τ < T . This is given by
θ := Vˆτ + 1l{τC<τI}LCY
− − 1l{τI<τC}LIY + (5)
where, for a real number x we are using the notation x− = max(−x, 0). In the above expression,
Y := Vˆτ −Mτ− = (1 − α)Vˆτ − β
(
V aRq(Vˆ(τ+δ)∧T − Vˆτ )
)+
is the value of the claim at default netted
of the posted collateral, and 0 ≤ LI , LC ≤ 1 are the loss rates on the trader and counterparty claims,
respectively.
Alternatively, we can represent the value of the portfolio at default as
θ = θ(τ, Vˆ,M) = 1l{τI<τC}θI(Vˆτ ,Mτ−) + 1l{τC<τI}θC(Vˆτ ,Mτ−),
where we define
θI(vˆ,m) := vˆ − LI
(
vˆ −m)+, θC(vˆ,m) := vˆ + LC(vˆ −m)−,
and recall
Mt = αVˆt + β
(
V aRq(Vˆ(t+δ)∧T − Vˆt | τ ∧ τ(N) > t)
)+
.
Note that
(
θI(Vˆt,Mt)
)
t≥0 and
(
θC(Vˆt,Mt)
)
t≥0 are also piecewise deterministic and piecewise con-
tinuous F-adapted processes.
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Remark 3.4. In practice, the actual value of the recovery rate is also uncertain and unknown till the
end of the resolution process. Empirical research has shown that it tends to be inversely related to the
default probability of the bond issuer (Altman and Kishore (1996)). From a mathematical perspective,
adding uncertainty in the counterparty’s account rate does not introduce conceptual challenges. This
is because the closeout value of the transaction given in (5) is linear in the loss rate. Apart from
introducing additional notational burden, such an uncertainty can be handled by a straightforward
adaption of the comparison argument in Theorem 5.4 exploiting the monotonicity of the loss rate.
Equivalently, in a scenario with loss rate uncertainty captured by a lower and upper bound, we can
think of LC as representing the worst-case loss rate, i.e., that associated with the most costly scenario
for the trade.
4 Wealth process & Arbitrage
We analyze a stylized model of single name credit default swaps, and because we are considering a
replicating portfolio from the point of view of the protection buyer, we view all exchanged cash flows
from the point of view of the protection seller. If the trader purchases protection from her counterparty
against the default of the i-th firm, then the trader makes a stream of continuous payments at a rate
Si of the notional to her counterparty, up until contract maturity or the arrival of the credit event,
whichever occurs earlier. Upon arrival of the default event of the i-th firm, and if this occurs before
the maturity T , the protection seller pays to the protection buyer the loss on the notional, obtained
by multiplying the loss rate Li by the notional. As the notional enters linearly in all calculations, we
fix it to be one.
Recall that ξi denotes the number of shares of the defaultable account associated with the reference
entity i, ξf the number of shares in the funding account, and we use ξI and ξC to denote the number
of shares of trader and counterparty defaultable accounts, respectively. Using the identity (1), we may
write the wealth process as a sum of contributions from each individual account:
Vt :=
N∑
i=1
ξitB
i
t + ξItBIt + ξCt BCt + ξ
f
t B
rf
t − ψmt Brmt . (6)
For the purpose of arbitrage-free valuation, it is important to consider not only the actual CDS
portfolio, but an arbitrary multiple of it. Hence, we will consider a multiple γ of the acquired portfolio,
and focus on self-financing strategies.
Definition 4.1. A collateralized trading strategy ϕ :=
(
ξ1t , . . . , ξ
N
t , ξ
f
t , ξ
I
t , ξ
C
t t ≥ 0
)
associated with γ
shares of a portfolio w = (w1, w2, . . . , wN ), where wi ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1, . . . , N , is self-financing if, for
t ∈ [0, τ ∧ τ(N)], it holds that
Vt(γ) := V0(γ) +
N∑
i=1
∫ t
0
ξiu dB
i
u +
∫ t
0
ξIu dB
I
u +
∫ t
0
ξCu dB
C
u +
∫ t
0
ξfu dB
rf
u −
∫ t
0
ψmu dB
rm
u
+ γ
N∑
i=1
wiSi (τi ∧ t). (7)
The above expression takes into account the spread payments received/paid by the investor for all CDS
contracts which she sold to (resp. purchased from) her counterparty. The set of admissible trading
strategies consists of F-predictable processes ϕ such that the portfolio process Vt(γ) is bounded from
below (cf. Delbaen and Schachermayer (2006)).
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Remark 4.2. Note that the spread payments paid by the trader are continuously reinvested into the
replicating instruments (defaultable accounts) or deposited in the funding account. This setup differs
from Bielecki et al. (2008) where the spread payments are used to increase the positions in the CDS
instruments. The difference stems from the fact that, in their model, the CDS contracts are liquidly
traded replicating instruments, whereas in our case they are part of the portfolio to be replicated.
Before discussing the arbitrage-free valuation of the CDS portfolio, we have to clarify the as-
sumptions under which the underlying market is free of arbitrage from the investor’s perspective
(conceptually, we follow (Bielecki and Rutkowski, 2014, Section 3)). Thus, to start with, we exclude
the CDS instruments from our consideration, and consider a trader who is only allowed to buy or
sell shares of the defaultable accounts (associated with the reference entities, her counterparty or the
investor’s firm itself) and to borrow or lend money from the treasury desk.
Definition 4.3. The market (B1, B2, . . . , BN , BI , BC) admits investor’s arbitrage if, given a non-
negative initial capital x ≥ 0, there exists an admissible trading strategy ϕ = (ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξN , ξf , ξI , ξC)
such that P
[
Vτ ≥ er
+
f
τx
]
= 1 and P
[
Vτ > e
r+
f
τx
]
> 0. If the market does not admit investor’s arbitrage
for a given level x ≥ 0 of initial capital, the market is said to be arbitrage free from the investor’s
perspective.
We impose the following assumption and argue that it provides a necessary and sufficient condition
for the absence of arbitrage.
Assumption 4.4. rD ∨ r+f < mini∈{1,...N,I} µi∧µC .
Remark 4.5. Necessity: The condition rD < mini∈{1,...N,I,C} µi is needed for the existence of the
valuation measure defined in Eq. (2) (hQi = µi−rD and risk-neutral default intensities must be positive).
Thus, we should impose µC > rD, but as the true account rate µC is unobservable, we impose instead
the slightly stronger µ
C
> rD. The condition r+f < mini∈{1,...N,I} µi ∧ µC has an even more practical
interpretation because it precludes the arbitrage opportunity of short selling the defaultable accounts
while investing the proceeds in the funding account. Strictly speaking, the condition rD < µI ∧ µC is
not necessary from an arbitrage point of view, because it addresses only the soundness of the market
from the perspective of the valuation party. While rD < mini∈{1,...N} µi is necessary to conclude that
the valuation party’s market model is free of arbitrage, one might hypothesize a situation in which
rD≥µI ∧ µC . From a practical perspective, this is however rather unlikely, as rD is typically assumed
to be an overnight index swap (OIS) rate and as such lower than the return rates of the defaultable
accounts.
Having argued about the necessity in the above remark, we show that Assumption 4.4 is also
sufficient to guarantee that the underlying market (i.e., excluding the credit default swap securities)
is free of arbitrage. The proof proceeds along very similar lines as Proposition 4.4 in Bichuch et al.
(2017), and is delegated to the appendix.
Proposition 4.6. Under Assumption 4.4, the model does not admit arbitrage opportunities for the
investor for any x ≥ 0.
As in Bichuch et al. (2017), we will define the notion of an arbitrage free price of a derivative
security from the investor’s perspective. We assume that the investor has zero initial capital, or
equivalently, she does not have liquid initial capital that can be used for replicating the claim until
maturity. The replicating portfolio will thus be implemented through purchases/sales of shares of the
defaultable accounts and of the funding account.
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Definition 4.7. The valuation P ∈ R of a derivative security with terminal payoff ϑ ∈ FT is called
investor’s arbitrage-free if for all γ ∈ R, buying γ securities for γP and trading in the market with an
admissible strategy and zero initial capital, does not create investor’s arbitrage.
Let Vt represent the price process of the replicating portfolio, and given by the supremum over all
arbitrage free prices. Then we define the total valuation adjustment XVA as the difference between
this upper arbitrage price and the clean price, i.e.,
XVAt(γ) = Vt(γ)− γVˆt. (8)
XVA thus quantifies the total costs (including collateral, funding, and counterparty risk related costs)
incurred by the trader to replicate the sold CDS portfolio. Notice that, at time t, the investor does
not know the actual counterparty account rate µC for the time interval [t, τ ]. Hence, she is not able
to execute the replication strategy yielding the value process V , because all what she knows about the
account rate is that µ
C
≤ µC ≤ µC . Therefore, she will have to consider the worst case, accounting
for all possible F-predictable dynamics of the account rate process in the interval
[
µ
C
, µC
]
. Denote
the valuation of the replicating portfolio when µC = µ by V µ. The robust XVA is defined as
rXVAt(γ) = ess sup
µ∈[µ
C
,µC ]
V µt (γ)1l{t<τ} + Vt(γ)1l{t≥τ} − γVˆt. (9)
Notice that the supremum is taken over all admissible valuations only prior to the occurrence of the
trader or her counterparty’s default. In particular, the valuation process at and after default depends
only on the closeout value and thus does not depend on the extremes µ
C
and µC of the uncertainty
interval.
5 Robust XVA for Credit Swaps
In this section, we derive explicit representations for the robust XVA of a credit default swap portfolio.
To highlight the main mathematical arguments and economic implications of the results, we start
analyzing the case of a single credit default swap in Section 5.1. We develop a comparison argument
to establish the uniqueness of the robust XVA process and of the corresponding super-replicating
strategies in Section 5.2. We provide an explicit computation of margins under the proposed framework
in Section 5.3. We generalize the analysis to a portfolio of credit default swaps in Section 5.4.
5.1 BSDE representation of XVA
This section characterizes the XVA process given in Eq. (8) as the solution to a BSDE. We start
analyzing the dynamics of the process Vt(γ). Given a self financing strategy, the investor’s wealth
process in (7) under the risk neutral measure Q follows the dynamics
dVt(γ) =
(
rfξ
f
t B
rf
t + rDξ1t P 1t + rDξItBIt + rDξCt BCt − rmψmt Brmt + γS1
)
dt
− ξ1tB1t d$1,Qt − ξItBIt− d$I,Qt − ξCt BCt− d$C,Qt
=
(
r+f
(
ξft B
rf
t
)+ − r−f (ξft Brft )− + rDξ1tB1t + rDξItBIt + rDξCt BCt ) dt
+
(
r+m
(
Mt
)+ − r−m(Mt)− + γS1) dt− ξ1tB1t− + d$1,Qt − ξItBIt− d$I,Qt − ξCt BCt−d$C,Qt .
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Setting
Z1,γt := −ξ1tB1t−, ZI,γt := −ξItBIt−, ZC,γt := −ξCt BCt−, (10)
and using Eq. (6), we obtain that
ξft B
rf
t = Vt(γ)− ξ1t P 1t − ξIt P It − ξCt PCt −Mt. (11)
We may then rewrite the wealth dynamics as
dVt(γ) =
(
r+f
(
Vt(γ) + Z1,γt + Z
I,γ
t + Z
C,γ
t − |γ|Mt
)+ − r−f (Vt(γ) + Z1,γt + ZI,γt + ZC,γt − |γ|Mt)−
− rDZ1,γt − rDZI,γt − rDZC,γt + r+m |γ|M+t − r−m |γ|M−t + γS1
)
dt
+ Z1,γt d$
1,Q
t + Z
I,γ
t d$
I,Q
t + Z
C,γ
t d$
C,Q
t .
To study the robust replicating strategy, we use the above dynamics to formulate the BSDE associated
with the portfolio replicating the credit default swap. This is given by
−dVt(γ) = f
(
t, Vt(γ), Z1,γt , Z
I,γ
t , Z
C,γ
t , γ;Mt
)
dt− Z1,γt d$1,Qt − ZI,γt d$I,Qt − ZC,γt d$C,Qt ,
Vτ∧τ1(γ) = γL11lτ1<τ + θI(γVˆτ , |γ|Mτ−)1l{τ<τ1∧τC∧T} + θC(γVˆτ , |γ|Mτ−)1l{τ<τ1∧τI∧T}, (12)
where the driver f : Ω× [0, T ]× R5, (ω, t, v, z, zI , zC , γ) 7→ f(t, v, z, zI , zC , γ;M) is given by
f
(
t, v, z1, zI , zC , γ;M
)
:= −
(
r+f
(
v + z1 + zI + zC − |γ|Mt
)+ − r−f (v + z1 + zI + zC − |γ|Mt)−
− rDz1 − rDzI − rDzC + r+m |γ|M+t − r−m |γ|M−t + γS1
)
. (13)
In the above expression, we highlight the dependence on the collateral process M that is used to
mitigate the default losses associated with the γ units of the traded CDS contract. In the case
the reference entity defaults before the investor or her counterparty, τ1 < τ , the terminal condition
is given by the loss term −γL1. This is consistent with the fact that, at this time, the value of
the transaction from the investor’s point of view corresponds with the third party valuation γVˆτ1 =
Cˆ1(τ1) = L11l{τ1≤T}. By positive homogeneity of the driver f with respect to γ > 0, we will assume
that γ = 1 throughout the paper and suppress it from the superscript. The case γ = −1 follows from
symmetric arguments.
Next, we study the dynamics of the credit default swap price process Vˆ , viewed from the valuation
agent’s perspective. Such a process satisfies a BSDE that can be derived similarly to Eq. (12) (essen-
tially ignoring the terms ZI , ZC as well as the collateral terms, setting r−f = r
+
f = rD, and normalizing
γ = 1). This is given by
−dVˆt =
(−rDVˆt − S1) dt− Zˆ1t d$1,Qt ,
Vˆτ1∧T = L11lτ1<T . (14)
This BSDE is well known to admit the unique solution (Vˆt, Zˆ1t ), where Vˆ can be represented
explicitly (see the Appendix) as
Vˆt = Cˆ1(t) = −EQ
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ u
t
hQ1 (s)+rDdsS1 du−
∫ T
t
L1h
Q
1 (u)e
−
∫ u
t
hQ1 (s)+rDdsdu
∣∣∣∣Ft]1l{t≤τ1}. (15)
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We immediately obtain a BSDE for the XVA process given by
−dXVAt = f˜
(
t,XVAt, Z˜1t , Z˜It , Z˜Ct ;M
)
dt− Z˜1t d$1,Qt − Z˜It d$I,Qt − Z˜Ct d$C,Qt ,
XVAτ∧τ1 = θ˜C(Vˆτ ,Mτ−)1l{τ<τ1∧τI∧T} + θ˜I(Vˆτ ,Mτ−)1l{τ<τ1∧τC∧T}, (16)
where
Z˜1t := Z1t − Zˆ1t , Z˜It := ZIt , Z˜Ct := ZCt ,
θ˜C(vˆ,m) := LC(vˆ −m)−, θ˜I(vˆ,m) := −LI(vˆ −m)+, (17)
and
f˜
(
t, xva, z˜1, z˜I , z˜C ;M
)
:= −
(
r+f
(
xva+ z˜1 + z˜I + z˜C + L1 −Mt
)+ − r−f (xva+ z˜1 + z˜I + z˜C + L1 −Mt)−
− rDz˜1 − rDz˜I − rDz˜C + r+m
(
Mt
)+ − r−m(Mt)− − rDL1).
Above, we have used the fact that Zˆ1t = L1 − Vˆt− = L1 − Vˆt by stochastic continuity and thus
Z1t = Z˜1t + Zˆ1t = Z˜1t + L1 − Vˆt.
We can now apply the reduction technique developed by Crépey and Song (2015) to find a con-
tinuous ordinary differential equation describing the XVA prior to the investor and her counterparty’s
default.
Proposition 5.1. The BSDE
−dUˇt = gˇ
(
t, Uˇt; Vˆ,M
)
dt, (18)
UˇT = 0,
in the (trivial) filtration F, with driver
gˇ
(
t, uˇ; Vˆ,M
)
= hQI
(
θ˜I(Vˆt,Mt−)− uˇ
)
+ hQC
(
θ˜C(Vˆt,Mt−)− uˇ
)− hQ1 uˇ
+ f˜
(
t, uˇ,−uˇ, θ˜I(Vˆt,Mt−)− uˇ, θ˜C(Vˆt,Mt−)− uˇ;M
)
(19)
admits a unique solution Uˇ , that is related to the unique solution
(
XVA, Z˜1, Z˜I , Z˜C
)
of the BSDE in
Eq. (16) as follows. On the one hand
Uˇt := XVAt∧(τ∧τ1)−
is a solution to the ODE (reduced BSDE) in Eq. (18), and on the other hand a solution to the full
XVA BSDE (16) is given by
XVAt = Uˇt1l{t<τ∧τ1} +
(
θ˜C(VˆτC ,MτC−)1l{τC<τ1∧τI∧T} + θ˜I(VˆτI ,MτI−)1l{τI<τ1∧τC∧T}
)
1l{t≥τ∧τ1}, (20)
Z˜1t = −Uˇt1l{t≤τ∧τ1}, Z˜It =
(
θ˜I(Vˆt,Mt−)− Uˇt
)
1l{t≤τ∧τ1}, Z˜
C
t =
(
θ˜C(Vˆt,Mt−)− Uˇt
)
1l{t≤τ∧τ1}.
The uniqueness of the solution to the original BSDE for V as well as to their projected versions in
the F-filtration follows from the definition of XVA.
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Corollary 5.2. The BSDE (12) admits a unique solution. This solution is related to the unique
solution U¯ of the ODE
−dU¯t = g
(
t, U¯t; Vˆ,M
)
dt,
U¯T = 0, (21)
in the filtration F with
g
(
t, u¯; Vˆ,M
)
= hQI
(
θI(Vˆt,Mt−)− u¯
)
+ hQC
(
θC(Vˆt,Mt−)− u¯
)− hQ1 u¯
+ f
(
t, u¯, L1 − u¯, θI(Vˆt,Mt−)− u¯, θC(Vˆt,Mt−)− u¯;M
)
via the following relations. On the one hand
U¯t := Vt∧(τ∧τ1)−
is a solution to the reduced BSDE (21), while on the other hand a solution to the full BSDE (12) is
given by
Vt := U¯t1l{t<τ∧τ1} +
(
L11lτ1<τ + θC(VˆτC ,MτC−)1l{τC<τ1∧τI∧T} + θI(VˆτI ,MτI−)1l{τI<τ1∧τC∧T}
)
1l{t≥τ∧τ1},
Z1t := L1 − U¯t1l{t<τ∧τ1}, ZIt :=
(
θI(Vˆt,Mt−)− U¯t
)
1l{t≤τ∧τ1}, Z
C
t :=
(
θC(Vˆt,Mt−)− U¯t
)
1l{t≤τ∧τ1}.
Using the above representation, we can provide explicit representations for the replication strategies
of the XVA. We will use the tilde symbol ( ˜ ) to denote these replicating strategies (e.g., ξ˜1, ξ˜I , ξ˜C
denote, respectively, the number of shares of the defaultable accounts associated with the reference
entity, trader and her counterparty) so to distinguish them from the strategies used to replicate the
CDS price process. Using the martingale representation theorem for the probability space (Ω,F ,F,Q)
and account price dynamics, we obtain that
ξ˜1t = −
Z˜1t
B1t−
1l{t<τ∧τ1} =
Uˇt
B1t−
1l{t<τ∧τ1}. (22)
Invoking Theorem 5.1 along with equations (10) and (17) we conclude that
ξ˜It = −
Z˜It
BIt−
1l{t≤τ∧τ1} =
LI(Vˆt −Mt−)+ + Uˇt
BIt−
1l{t≤τ∧τ1},
ξ˜Ct = −
Z˜Ct
BCt−
1l{t≤τ∧τ1} =
−LC(Vˆt −Mt−)− + Uˇt
BCt−
1l{t≤τ∧τ1},
and from equations (1) and (4) it follows that
ψ˜mt = −
Mt−
Brmt
1l{τ∧τ1>t}.
Finally, using Eq. (11) and the identity Vt = XV At + Vˆt, we obtain
ξ˜ft =
Vt − Vˆt − ξ˜1tB1t− − ξ˜ItBIt− − ξ˜Ct BCt− −Mt−
B
rf
t
1l{τ∧τ1>t}
= −2Uˇt + LC(Vˆt −Mt−)
− − LI(Vˆt −Mt−)+ −Mt−
B
rf
t
1l{τ∧τ1>t}, (23)
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where in the last equality above, we have used the definition of XVA given in Eq. (8) together with
the identity XVAt = Uˇt on {τ ∧ τ1 > t}.
Note that the replicating strategies are specified only in terms of account prices and are thus known
to the investor at time t. However, they neither give information on the value of the XVA process nor
on the evolution of the replicating strategy, because the default intensity process hQC is unknown to
the investor.
5.2 Comparison Pricing and Super-replicating Strategies
This section develops a comparison principle for the reduced BSDE (18) solves by the XVA process.
We subsequently use this result to construct a super-replicating strategy for the XVA.
The BSDE given in Eq. (18) is effectively an ODE. To maintain consistency with the theory of
ODEs, we switch the direction of time by defining vˆ(t) := VˆT−t and m(t) := MT−t. It follows from
Eq. (15) that vˆ is bounded, i.e., |vˆ| ≤M0 for some constant M0. Similarly, set uˇ(t) = UˇT−t. Applying
the reduction technique of Crépey and Song (2015) to Eq. (14), similarly to how it was done above in
Proposition 5.1, we get
∂tvˆ = −(S1 − hQ1 L1)− (hQ1 + rD)vˆ, (24)
vˆ(0) = 0.
We may then rewrite Eq. (18) as
∂tuˇ = gˇ(t, uˇ; vˆ,m), (25)
uˇ(0) = 0.
Taken together, the two ODES (24) and (25) constitute a system of ODEs. The functions hQ1 (t), h
Q
I (t),
hQC(t), t ∈ [0, T ], are all piecewise (deterministic) continuous. The following theorem, whose proof is
reported in the appendix, provides an existence and uniqueness result.
Proposition 5.3. There exists a unique (piecewise) classical solution to the system of ODEs (24)–
(25).
The following comparison principle, whose proof is reported in the appendix, will be used to find
the super-replicating price of the XVA.
Theorem 5.4 (Comparison Theorem). Assume that there exists µC ≥ µC > rD such that µC ≥ µ
Q
C ≥
µ
C
and let uˇ be the solution of ODE (25). Let
(µC)∗(vˆ,m, uˇ) = µC1l{θ˜C(vˆ,m)−uˇ≥0} + µC1l{θ˜C(vˆ,m)−uˇ≤0},
(µC)∗(vˆ,m, uˇ) = µC1l{θ˜C(vˆ,m)−uˇ≥0} + µC1l{θ˜C(vˆ,m)−uˇ≤0},
and define the drivers g∗ and g∗ by plugging the default intensities (µQC)∗ and (µ
Q
C)∗ into the expression
of gˇ given by (19), i.e.,
g∗
(
t, uˇ; vˆ,m
)
= hQI
(
θ˜I(vˆt,mt)− uˇt
)
+ ((µC)∗(vˆt,mt, uˇt)− rD)
(
θ˜C(vˆt,mt)− uˇt
)− hQ1 uˇt
+ f˜
(
t, uˇt,−uˇt, θ˜I(vˆt,mt)− uˇt, θ˜C(vˆt,mt)− uˇt; vˆ,m
)
,
g∗
(
t, uˇ; vˆ,m
)
= hQI
(
θ˜I(vˆt,mt)− uˇt
)
+ ((µC)∗(vˆt,mt, uˇt)− rD)
(
θ˜C(vˆt,mt)− uˇt
)− hQ1 uˇt
+ f˜
(
t, uˇt,−uˇt, θ˜I(vˆt,mt)− uˇt, θ˜C(vˆt,mt)− uˇt; vˆ,m
)
.
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Let uˇ∗ and uˇ∗ be the solutions to ODE (25) where gˇ is replaced by g∗ and g∗ respectively, i.e.,
∂tuˇ
∗ = g∗(t, uˇ∗; vˆ,m), uˇ∗(0) = 0,
∂tuˇ∗ = g∗(t, uˇ∗; vˆ,m), uˇ∗(0) = 0. (26)
Then uˇ∗ ≤ uˇ ≤ uˇ∗.
The valuation process calculated based on the extremes of the uncertainty interval
(
µC
)∗ and (µC)∗
are denoted, by V (µC)∗ and V (µC)∗ respectively.
The ODEs (26) may be understood as the credit risk counterparts of the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt
PDEs for the uncertain volatility model; see Avellaneda et al. (1995). The main difference between
our study and theirs is that, in their paper, the uncertainty comes from the volatility which appears
as a second order term in the differential operator. Hence, the indicator function specifying the value
of volatility to use in the pricing formula depends on the second order derivative of the option price
with respect to the underlying, i.e., the Gamma of the option. In our setting, the indicator function
specifying the value of counterparty’s account rate to use depends on the relation between the current
value of the XVA replication and the close-out value. The value of the replicating trade jumps to the
close-out value when the counterparty defaults. If the size of this jump is positive, i.e., the close-out
value of the transaction is higher, then the trader needs to be short the counterparty’s account to
replicate this jump-to-default risk. As the trader wants to consider the worst possible scenario for
her trade, she would choose the largest value of the counterparty account rate µC because this yields
the lowest rate of return on her short position. Vice-versa, if the jump is negative, the trader needs
to be long the counterparty defaultable account. Consequently, the trader would use the smaller
counterparty’s account rate µ
C
to deal with the worst possible replication scenario.6
Our objective is to provide a tight upper bound for the XVA price process, because this would
imply a tight super-replicating price. We achieve this by connecting such a super-replicating price to
the rXVA defined in Eq. (9). Define the process Uˇ∗t := uˇ∗(T−t). The following theorem shows that the
rXVA coincides with the super-replicating price, and additionally specifies the super-replicating strat-
egy. The latter is obtained by taking the strategy given in (22)–(23) and using the super-replicating
price Uˇ∗ in place of Uˇ .
Theorem 5.5. The robust XVA admits the explicit representation given by
rXVAt = Uˇ∗t 1l{t<τ∧τ1} +
(
θ˜C(VˆτC ,MτC−)1l{τC<τ1∧τI∧T} + θ˜I(VˆτI ,MτI−)1l{τI<τ1∧τC∧T}
)
1l{t≥τ∧τ1}, (27)
6Unlike the counterparty’s account rate, the dependence of the valuation equation on the loss rate is monotone. Hence,
differently from the account rate that switch between the two bounds, in the case of uncertainty in the counterparty’s loss
rate LC one would use always the worst-case loss rate for the super-replication. See also the discussion in Remark 3.4.
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and the corresponding super-replicating strategies for rXVA are given by
ξ1,∗t =
Uˇ∗t
B1t−
1l{t<τ∧τ1},
ξI,∗t =
LI(Vˆt −Mt−)+ + Uˇ∗t
BIt−
1l{t≤τ∧τ1},
ξC,∗t =
−LC(Vˆt −Mt−)− + Uˇ∗t
BCt−
1l{t≤τ∧τ1},
ψm,∗t = −
Mt−
Brmt
1l{t<τ∧τ1},
ξf,∗t =
−2Uˇ∗t + LC(Vˆt −Mt−)− − LI(Vˆt −Mt−)+ −Mt−
B
rf
t
1l{t<τ∧τ1}. (28)
Proof. The proof consists of two parts. In the first part, we verify that the expression of rXVA given
in Eq. (27) is the smallest super-replicating price. In the second part, we show that the strategy given
in (28) is a super-replicating strategy. This requires showing that the implementation of this strategy
does not require any cash infusion, and that the wealth process controlled by this strategy is exactly
the rXVA process.
Define XVAµt := V
µ
t −Vˆt for µ ∈ F, µC ≤ µ ≤ µC and XVA∗t := V
(µC)∗
t −Vˆt, where we recall that V µt
is the valuation process of the replicating portfolio obtained by setting the counterparty account rate
equal to µ; see also the discussion before Eq. (9). First, note that XVA∗t ≥ XVAµt . This follows directly
from Theorem 5.4, which provides a comparison result for the term Uˇt appearing on the right hand side
of the XVA expression (20). Therein, it is enough to observe that the risk-neutral default intensity is
just µ−rD, and notice that the two closeout terms are just independent of the rate µ. Hence, the right
hand side of Eq. (27) is smaller than the left hand side: the latter represents a specific F-predictable
intensity process satisfying the boundary conditions, while the former is the supremum over all such
intensity processes. This shows that the left side of Eq. (27) is less or equal than the right side. To
show the reverse inequality, i.e., that the left side of Eq. (27) is greater or equal than the right side, we
note that the family (XVAµt )µ∈F,µ∈[µ
C
,µC ] is directed upwards, i.e., for µ
′, µ′′ ∈ F, µ
C
≤ µ′, µ′′ ≤ µC ,
there exists a process µ′′′ ∈ F, µ
C
≤ µ′′′ ≤ µC , such that XVAµ
′ ∨ XVAµ′′ ≤ XVAµ′′′ . Indeed, setting
A := {ω ∈ Ω : XV Aµ′t > XV Aµ
′′
t } we can define µ′′′ directly by setting µ′′′(s) := µ′(s)1lA + µ′′(s)1lAc
for s ≥ t and µ′′′(s) = 0, for 0 ≤ s < t. Such a process is clearly Fs-measurable because A is Ft-
measurable. As the essential supremum of an upward directed set can be written as monotone limit
(see (Föllmer et al., 2004, Theorem A.32)), limn→∞XVAµ
(n) = rXVA. Thus, as the countable union
of nullsets is still a nullset we have that, for all t, rXVAt is smaller or equal than the right side of
Eq. (27).
Next, we provide the expressions for the super-replicating strategies. These are derived by replacing
Uˇt with Uˇ∗t into equations (22)–(23). Using the replicating strategies defined in (28), we obtain that,
on the set {t < τ}, the value of the replicating portfolio at time t is
ξ1,∗u B
1
u + ξ
I,∗
t B
I
t + ξ
C,∗
t B
C
t + ξ
f,∗
t B
rf
t − ψm,∗t Brmt = Uˇ∗t . (29)
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On the set {t < τ}, the change in value of the portfolio is
ξ1,∗u dB
1
u + ξ
I,∗
t dB
I
t + ξ
C,∗
t dB
C
t + ξ
f,∗
t dB
rf
t − ψm,∗t dBrmt (30)
=
(
µ1Uˇ
∗
t +
(
LI(Vˆt −Mt−)+ + Uˇ∗t
)
µI + (Uˇ∗t − LC(Vˆt −Mt−)−)µC
+ r+mM+t + r−mM−t + r+f (−2Uˇ∗t + LC(Vˆt −Mt−)− − LI(Vˆt −Mt−)+ −Mt−)+
+ r−f (−2Uˇ∗t + LC(Vˆt −Mt−)− − LI(Vˆt −Mt−)+ −Mt−)−
)
dt.
Additionally, for the replicating strategy (22)–(23) to be self-financing, we need to include the cash
flow (
rf (ξf,∗t )− rD
)
L1dt. (31)
The presence of this cash flow is due to the fact that the clean valuation Vˆ is computed using the
publicly available discount rate rD, while the private valuation V is obtained using the funding rate
rf . Such a cash flow needs to be accounted for in the implementation of the super-replicating strategy.
Taken together, equations (30) and (31) describe the change in value of the super-replicating portfolio.
Next, we compare it with the change in value of the robust XVA process given by
dUˇ∗t =
(
(rD + hQI )
(
LI(Vˆt −Mt−)+ + Uˇ∗t
)− (µC)∗(Vˆt,Mt, Uˇ∗t )(LC(Vˆt −Mt−)− − Uˇ∗t )
+ µ1Uˇ∗t + r+mM+t + r−mM−t + r+f (−2Uˇ∗t + LC(Vˆt −Mt−)− − LI(Vˆt −Mt−)+ + L1 −Mt−)+
+ r−f (−2Uˇ∗t + LC(Vˆt −Mt−)− − LI(Vˆt −Mt−)+ + L1 −Mt−)− − rDL1
)
dt. (32)
Using the fact that (
(µC)∗(Vˆt,Mt, Uˇ∗t )− µC
) (
θ˜C(Vˆt,Mt)− Uˇ∗t
) ≥ 0,
it follows that (30) together with (31) dominate (32) from above, i.e.,
ξ1,∗u dB
1
u + ξ
I,∗
t dB
I
t + ξ
C,∗
t dB
C
t + ξ
f,∗
t dB
rf
t − ψm,∗t dBrmt +
(
rf (ξf,∗t )− rD
)
L1dt ≥ dUˇ∗t . (33)
The above computations were done on the set {t < τ}. At the stopping time τ it can be easily checked
that both Uˇ and the super-replicating portfolio are zero. Together with (33) and Theorem 5.4, it
follows that the super-replicating portfolio dominates Uˇ for all times t.
We notice that if we use the robust super-replicating strategies given in (28) and start with an
initial capital rXVA0, then there will be no tracking error in the sense of El Karoui et al. (1998).
In other words, the error committed for implementing the robust strategy
(
ξ1,t , ξ
I,
t , ξ
C,
t , ξ
f,
t , ψ
m,∗
t
)
in
the real market (where the return rate of the counterparty account is µC) instead of the robust
market model (where the return rate of the counterparty account is (µC)∗) is zero. This may be
understood as follows: Eq. (29) shows that the value of the super-replicating portfolio is always rXVA.
However, until the earliest among the default time of the counterparty, investor, or maturity of the
CDS contract, whichever comes first, the super-replicating portfolio keeps generating profits because
the change in the value of the super-replicating portfolio is greater than the change in the value of the
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Uˇ∗, as shown in (33). In other words, during a time interval dt, the investor pockets an extra cash(
(µC)∗(Vˆt,Mt, Uˇ∗t )− µC
)(
θ˜C(Vˆt,Mt)− Uˇ∗t
)
dt at any time prior to the end of the replication strategy.
The robust strategies depend only on the XVA price process and the account prices, and are
independent of the default intensity hQC , the value of which is unknown to the investor.
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Figure 2: We use the following benchmark parameters: r±f = rD = 0.001, α =
β = 0, T = 3, LI = LC = 0.5, S1 = 2, h1(t) = 0.11l{0≤t<1} + 0.31l{1≤t<T}, L1 =
10, µI = 0.2001, µC = 0.2501, µC = 0.1501, µC = 0.2001. Left panel: Plot of uˇ (solid), uˇ
∗ (dashed) and
uˇ∗ (dotted) as a function of time. Right panel: Plot of θ˜C(vˆ, 0) (dash-dotted), −θ˜I(vˆ, 0) (dotted) and
uˇ (solid) as a function of time. In the left panel, the default intensity at which we switch between
the sub-and super-solutions is the crossing point of the dashed and dotted lines with the x-axis, that
occurs at approximately t = 2.67. In the right panel, the third party valuation vˆ becomes positive at
approximately t = 2.67.
In the case of zero margins, it follows directly from Eq. (17) that the third party valuation vˆ =
vˆ+ − vˆ− may be expressed in terms of the closeout value, and given by − θ˜C(vˆ,0)LC −
θ˜I(vˆ,0)
LI
. Hence, we
deduce from the right panel of Figure 2 that the third party valuation is negative prior to t = 1.83,
and positive for t > 1.83. Figure 2 also shows that the super-replicating strategy is non-trivial in the
sense that it is not monotone in the default intensity. As it can be seen from the right panel of Figure
2, the quantity θ˜C(vˆ, 0) − uˇ is zero at t0 ≈ 2.67, non-negative for t < t0, and strictly negative for
t > t0. This implies that (µC)∗ = µC prior to time t0 and while θ˜C(vˆ, 0)− uˇ ≥ 0, whereas after time
t0, (µC)∗ = µC , because we then have θ˜C(vˆ, 0)− uˇ ≤ 0. In other words, prior to t0 the trader will use
the largest value of the account rate µC for her super-replicating portfolio because the jump of the
super-replicating portfolio to the close-out value when the counterparty defaults, given by θ˜C(vˆ, 0)− uˇ,
is positive. After time t0, the trader will choose the smallest value µC of the account rate because
this jump would be negative. This is directly visible from the right panel of Figure 2, because the
dash-dotted line dominates the solid one until time t0, and after t0 the situation is reversed. This
analysis highlights a fundamental difference with respect to standard credit risk settings, that often
ignore collateralization and close-out terms, or models for XVA in which collateralization and close-out
value depend on the trader’s valuation process V itself as in Nie and Rutkowski (2016). In these cases,
the price of the derivative is monotone in the default intensity, while in our setting the value of the
super-replicating portfolio does not necessarily have this monotonicity property. This is due to the
fact that the collateralization and closeout process are exogenous, i.e., they depend on the external
valuation Vˆ of the third party, rather than on the value V of the super-replicating portfolio.
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5.3 Computation of Margins
We develop an explicit expression for the initial margins when the two parties trade γ units of a single
name credit default swap contract. Initial margins are determined using the value-at-risk criterion,
and need to be computed under the physical measure P as opposed to the valuation measure Q. By
the definition of V aR, we have
IMt(γ) = βV aRq
(
γVˆ(t+δ)∧T − γVˆt | τ ∧ τ(N) > t
)+
= β inf
{
K ∈ R>0 : P
[
γVˆ(t+δ)∧T + γVˆt > −K
∣∣τ > t] ≥ 1− q}. (34)
Thus, differently from the variation margin VM(γ) = αγVˆt1l{τ∧τ(N)>t} that is linear in γ, the initial
margin IM(γ) is only positively homogeneous in γ. We will therefore distinguish the cases γ = 1 and
γ = −1. Note first that
γ
(
Vˆ(t+δ)∧T − Vˆt
)
= −γ
{
S1 ((t+ δ) ∧ T − t) if τ ≥ (t+ δ) ∧ T,
−L1 + S1 (τ − t) otherwise.
The case γ = 1 is less frequently observed in practice. We typically expect L1 > S1T , as a protection
buyer is unlikely to pay more than what he would receive in the event of a default (notice that S1T is
the maximum payment the buyer would make). In this case, the exposure of the protection seller to
the protection buyer would be negative, resulting in negative V aR. In the case γ = −1, we obtain
P
[− Vˆ(t+δ)∧T + Vˆt > −K∣∣τ > t] = P
[− Vˆ(t+δ)∧T∧τ + Vˆt∧τ > −K]
P [τ > t]
=
∫ (t+δ)∧T
t (K − L1 + S1(u− t))+e−h
P
1(u)du∫∞
t e
−hP1(u)du
. (35)
Because the right hand side of Eq. (35) is continuous and increasing in K, the inequality specified the
probability event in (34) that characterizes the initial margins becomes an equality, and thus the V aR
can be numerically evaluated.
Example 5.6. Assume constant default intensities and t < T − δ. To calculate the initial margin
IMγt for γ = −1, we note that
P
[− Vˆ(t+δ)∧T + Vˆt > −K∣∣τ > t] = P
[− Vˆ(t+δ)∧T∧τ + Vˆt∧τ > −K]
P [τ > t]
=
∫ (t+δ)∧T
t (K − L1 + S1(u− t))+e−h
P
1(u)du∫∞
t e
−hP1(u)du
= 1− e−hP1
(
L1−K
S1
)
∧δ
.
Therefore, the value of K solving the above equation, i.e., the initial margin, is explicitly given by
IMt(−1) =
 β
(
L1 + S1 log qhP1
)
if q > e−hP1δ,
0 otherwise.
(36)
The initial margin formula (36) has a direct economic interpretation. First, we notice that the term
multiplying the spread S1 is negative, because the value-at-risk level q is between 0 and 1 and hence
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log q is negative. Thus, when the initial margin is nonzero, it is affine both in the loss rate and the
CDS spread, increasing in the loss rate and decreasing in the CDS spread. This is intuitive: the
protection seller increases the margin requirements if he has to make a larger payment at the credit
event, and decreases the requirement if the running spread premium received from the protection buyer
is higher. Moreover, the required margin is increasing in the default intensity of the reference entity
and, in the limiting case of an infinite default intensity, it converges to the product L1β of loss and
collateralization rates. This is in line with economic intuition: as the credit event becomes more
likely to occur, the protection seller asks the buyer to pay exactly the amount he would receive at the
credit event. Finally, the value of initial margins is decreasing in the value-at-risk level and linearly
increasing in the collateralization rate.
5.4 Credit Swap Portfolios
In this section, we generalize the analysis conducted in the previous sections to a portfolio of single
name credit default swaps, each referencing a different entity. To capture direct default contagion, we
let the default intensities of surviving entities depend on past defaults. Throughout the section, we
use the superscript (J), J ⊂ {1, ..., N}, to denote the set of already defaulted entities, while the other
entities in Jc := {1, ..., N}\J are all alive. For instance, V (J) denotes the replicating process of the
CDS portfolio when all the entities in the set J have defaulted, and all entities in the set Jc have not.
We denote by τ (J) the last default time of a reference entity in J (i.e., τ (J) = maxj∈J τj , assuming
maxj∈J τj < τi, i 6∈ J), and for i 6∈ J we use τ (J)i to denote the default time of the i-th reference entity
in the economic scenario after all reference entities in J have already defaulted.
First, we study the dynamics of the third party valuation process Vˆ . Note that if all entities have
defaulted, then Vˆ ({1,...,N}) = 0. The case when all entities except for i have already defaulted, that is
J = {1, ..., N}\{i} (in this case τ (J)i = τ ({1,..,N})), is analogous to the case of a single CDS contract,
whose price process has been given in Eq. (14). Hence
−dVˆ (J)t =
(
−rDVˆ (J)t − Si
)
dt− Zˆi,(J)t $i,(J),Qt ,
Vˆ
(J)
τ
(J)
i ∧T
= Li1l{τ (J)i <T}
. (37)
Next, we provide an inductive relation which relates the investor’s wealth price process in the state
where all entities in J have defaulted, to that in the state where the reference entity i 6∈ J additionally
defaults. The base case |J | = N − 1 has been given in (37). For the case |J | < N − 1, we obtain
−dVˆ (J)t = −
(
rDVˆ
(J)
t −
∑
k∈Jc
Sk
)
dt−
∑
k∈Jc
Zˆ
k,(J)
t $
k,(J),Q
t ,
Vˆ
(J)
T∧minj∈Jc τ (J)j
=
∑
k∈Jc
(
Lk + Vˆ ({k}∪J)
τ
(J)
k
)
1l{τ (J)
k
=minj∈Jc τ
(J)
j }
1l{τ (J)
k
<T}. (38)
The price process and the replicating strategy are then obtained by considering all possible subsets of
defaulted entities, leading to
Vˆt =
∑
J∈2{1,...,N}
Vˆ
(J)
t 1l{τ (J)∧τC∧τI∧T<t≤mink∈Jc τ (J)k ∧τC∧τI∧T}
,
Zˆit =
∑
J∈2{1,...,N}\{i}
Zˆ
i,(J)
t 1l{τ (J)∧τC∧τI∧T<t≤mink∈Jc τ (J)k ∧τC∧τI∧T}
.
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The collateral process M is still given by Eq. (4) along with the above expression for Vˆ .
Next, we use a similar inductive argument to define the V := (Vt)t≥0 process. Clearly, V ({1,...,N}) =
0. Consider now the state when all but entity i have defaulted, that is J = {1, ..., N}\{i} (and
τ
(J)
i = τ ({1,..,N})). The corresponding expression to (12) in the multi-name case is then given by
−dV (J)t = f
(
t, V
(J)
t , Z
i,(J)
t , Z
I,(J)
t , Z
C,(J)
t ;M (J), J
)
dt− Zi,(J)t d$i,(J),Qt − ZI,(J)t d$I,Qt − ZC,(J)t d$C,Qt ,
V
(J)
τ∧τ (J)i
= Li1l{τ (J)i <τ∧T}
+ θI(Vˆ (J)τ ,M
(J)
τ− )1l{τ<τ (J)i ∧τC∧T}
+ θC(Vˆ (J)τ ,M
(J)
τ− )1l{τ<τ (J)i ∧τI∧T}
,
where the representation of f has a similar structure to the single name case treated in (13), and is
given by
f
(
t, v, z, zI , zC ;M,J
)
:= −
(
r+f
(
v + z + zI + zC −M)+ − r−f (v + z + zI + zC −Mt)−
− rDz − rDzI − rDzC + r+mM+ − r−mM− +
∑
k∈Jc
Sk
)
.
Similar to Eq. (38), the wealth replicating process in the state where all reference entities in J have
defaulted is related to the state where the additional entity i 6∈ J defaults:
− dV (J)t = f
(
t, V
(J)
t ,
∑
k∈Jc
Z
k,(J)
t , Z
I,(J)
t , Z
C,(J)
t ;M (J), J
)
dt
−
∑
k∈Jc
Z
k,(J)
t d$
k,(J),Q
t − ZI,(J)t d$I,Qt − ZC,(J)t d$C,Qt ,
V
(J)
τ∧minj∈Jc τ (J)j
=
∑
k∈Jc
(
Lk + V ({k}∪J)
τ
(J)
k
)
1l{τ (J)
k
=minj∈Jc τ
(J)
j ∧τ}
1l{τ (J)
k
<T}
+ θI
(
Vˆ (J)τ ,Mτ−
)
1l{τI<minj∈Jc τ (J)j ∧τC∧T}
+ θC
(
γVˆ (J)τ ,Mτ−
)
1l{τC<minj∈Jc τ (J)j ∧τI∧T}
.
Altogether, we obtain
Vt =
∑
J∈2{1,...,N}
V
(J)
t 1l{τ (J)∧τC∧τI∧T<t≤mink∈Jc τ (J)k ∧τC∧τI∧T}
,
Zit =
∑
J∈2{1,...,N}\{i}
Z
i,(J)
t 1l{τ (J)∧τC∧τI∧T<t≤mink∈Jc τ (J)k ∧τC∧τI∧T}
,
ZIt =
∑
J∈2{1,...,N}
Z
I,(J)
t 1l{τ (J)∧τC∧τI∧T<t≤mink∈Jc τ (J)k ∧τC∧τI∧T}
,
ZCt =
∑
J∈2{1,...,N}
Z
C,(J)
t 1l{τ (J)∧τC∧τI∧T<t≤mink∈Jc τ (J)k ∧τC∧τI∧T}
.
Proceeding along the lines of Section 5, we can obtain a BSDE for the XVA process specified in
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Eq. (8):
−dXVA(J)t = f˜
(
t,XVA(J)t ,
∑
k∈Jc
Z˜
k,(J)
t , Z˜
I,(J)
t , Z˜
C,(J)
t ;M (J), J
)
dt
−
∑
k∈Jc
Z˜
k,(J)
t d$
k,(J),Q
t − Z˜I,(J)t d$I,Qt − Z˜C,(J)t d$C,Qt ,
XVA(J)
τ∧minj∈Jc τ (J)j
=
∑
k∈Jc
(
Lk + XVA({k}∪J)
τ
(J)
k
)
1l{τ (J)
k
=minj∈Jc τ
(J)
j ∧τ}
1l{τ (J)
k
<T}
+ θ˜I
(
Vˆ (J)τ ,Mτ−
)
1l{τI<minj∈Jc τ (J)j ∧τC∧T}
+ θ˜C
(
Vˆ (J)τ ,Mτ−
)
1l{τC<minj∈Jc τ (J)j ∧τI∧T}
)
,
where θ˜C and θ˜I are given in (17), Z˜i(J)t , Z˜
I,(J)
t and Z˜
C,(J)
t are defined as
Z˜
i,(J)
t := Z
i,(J)
t − Zˆi,(J), i ∈ Jc, Z˜I,(J)t := ZI,(J)t , Z˜C,(J)t := ZC,(J)t ,
and
f˜
(
t, xva, z˜, z˜I , z˜C ;M,J
)
: = −
(
r+f
(
xva+ z˜ + z˜I + z˜C +
∑
k∈Jc
Lk −Mt
)+
− r−f
(
xva+ z˜ + z˜I + z˜C +
∑
k∈Jc
Lk −Mt
)−
− rDz˜ − rDz˜I − rDz˜C + r+mM+t − r−mM−t − rD
∑
k∈Jc
Lk
)
,
where the terminal condition is XVA({1,...,N})t = 0. The BSDE in the reduced filtration F can be
obtained analogously to (18), and is given by
−dUˇ (J)t = gˇ
(
t, Uˇ
(J)
t ,
∑
k∈Jc
Uˇ
({k}∪J)
t ,
∑
k∈Jc
hQk Uˇ
({k}∪J)
t ; Vˆ (J),M (J), J
)
dt,
Uˇ
(J)
T = 0,
with
gˇ
(
t, uˇ,
◦
u,
•
u; Vˆ,M, J
)
= hQI
(
θ˜I(Vˆ (J)t ,M
(J)
t− )− uˇ
)
+ hQC
(
θ˜C(Vˆ (J)t ,M
(J)
t− )− uˇ
)
+
(•
u−
∑
k∈Jc
hQk uˇ
)
+ f˜
(
t, uˇ,
◦
u− |Jc| uˇ, θ˜I(Vˆ (J)t ,M (J)t− )− uˇ, θ˜C(Vˆ (J)t ,M (J)t− )− uˇ;M
)
. (39)
The starting point for the recursion is set to Uˇ ({1,...,N})t = 0.
Remark 5.7. For large portfolios, i.e., those referencing a high number N of entities, this system
of ODEs is computationally intractable. A solution to the ODE (39) would need to be obtained for
each subset of {1, ..., N}, that is a total of 2N solutions need to be computed. This system becomes
tractable only if the reference entities have identical characteristics (spreads, loss rates and default
intensities), and the default intensities depend only on the number of occurred defaults, but not on the
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identity of the defaulted entities, i.e., hQi = h
Q
i (t, |J |), i = 1, ..., N . In this case, the complexity grows
linearly and it is required to compute N ODE solutions. This assumption has been used to calibrate
models of direct default contagion for pricing. For instance, Frey and Backhaus (2004) split firms into
groups, each defining a specific default risk profile. Because firms belonging to the same group are
exchangeable, they naturally consider the above parameterization for the default intensity of each firm
in the portfolio. The dependence structure between ODEs has similar characteristics to that arising
in a binomial tree. Computations on a non-recombining tree are generally prohibitively expensive, and
thus recombining trees are usually used.
Assume that hQi , i ∈ {1, ..., N}, are all piecewise (deterministic) continuous. The extension of the
theorems developed in Section 5.2 for the case of a single CDS to the case of portfolios referencing
multiple entities is straightforward. For notational consistency, denote vˆ(J)(t) = Vˆ (J)T−t, uˇ(J)(t) = Uˇ
(J)
T−t
for all J ⊂ {1, ..., N}. The following proposition is the multi-dimensional extension of Proposition 5.3.
Its proof uses exactly the same arguments and is omitted here.
Proposition 5.8. There exists a unique (piecewise smooth) solution to the system of ODEs:
∂tvˆ
(J) = −rDvˆ(J) −
∑
k∈Jc
Sk +
∑
k∈Jc
(
Lk + vˆ({k}∪J) − v(J)
)
hQk , J ⊂ {1, ..., N},
vˆ(J)(0) = 0,
∂tuˇ
(J) = gˇ
t, uˇ(J), ∑
k∈Jc
uˇ({k}∪J),
∑
k∈Jc
hQk uˇ
({k}∪J); vˆ(J),m, J
 , J ⊂ {1, ..., N}, (40)
uˇ(J)(0) = 0.
Next, we present the multi-dimensional extension of Theorem 5.4. The proof presents an additional
induction step compared with the proof of Theorem 5.4, and the details are reported in the appendix.
Theorem 5.9 (Comparison Theorem). Let J ⊂ {1, ..., N}. Assume in addition to Assumption 4.4
that r−f < mini∈{1,...N,I} µi∧µC . Moreover, assume that there exists µC ≥ µC > rD such that µC ≥
µQC(t) ≥ µC , and let uˇ(J) be the solution of ODE (40). Let
(µC)∗(vˆ,m, uˇ) = µC1l{θ˜C(vˆ,m)−uˇ≥0} + µC1l{θ˜C(vˆ,m)−uˇ≤0},
(µC)∗(vˆ,m, uˇ) = µC1l{θ˜C(vˆ,m)−uˇ≥0} + µC1l{θ˜C(vˆ,m)−uˇ≤0},
and define g∗ and g∗ plugging (hQC)∗ and (h
Q
C)∗ into gˇ given in Eq. (39), i.e.,
g∗
(
t, uˇ,
◦
u,
•
u; vˆ,m, J
)
:= hQI
(
θ˜I(vˆ(t),m(t))− uˇ(t)
)
+ ((µC)∗(vˆ(t),m(t), uˇ(t))− rD)
(
θ˜C(vˆ(t),m(t))− uˇ(t)
)
+
(•
u−
∑
i∈Jc
hQi uˇ(t)
)
+ f˜
(
t, uˇ(t), ◦u− |Jc| uˇ(t), θ˜I(vˆ(t),m(t))− uˇ(t), θ˜C(vˆ(t),m(t))− uˇ(t); vˆ,m, J
)
,
g∗
(
t, uˇ,
◦
u,
•
u; vˆ,m, J
)
:= hQI
(
θ˜I(vˆ(t),m(t))− uˇ(t)
)
+ ((µC)∗(vˆ(t),m(t), uˇ(t))− rD)
(
θ˜C(vˆ(t),m(t))− uˇ(t)
)
+
(•
u−
∑
i∈Jc
hQi uˇ(t)
)
+ f˜
(
t, uˇ(t), ◦u− |Jc| uˇ(t), θ˜I(vˆ(t),m(t))− uˇ(t), θ˜C(vˆ(t),m(t))− uˇ(t); vˆ,m, J
)
.
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Finally, let uˇ(J),∗ be the solution to ODE (40), but with gˇ replaced by g∗, that is
∂tuˇ
(J),∗ = g∗
t, uˇ(J),∗, ∑
k∈Jc
uˇ{k}∪J,∗,
∑
k∈Jc
hQk uˇ
{k}∪J,∗; vˆ(J),m, J
 ,
uˇ(J),∗(0) = 0,
and similarly, let uˇ(J)∗ be the solution of ODE (40) where we replace gˇ with g∗. Then uˇ(J)∗ ≤ uˇ(J) ≤
uˇ(J),∗.
It now remains to find the super-replicating strategy for the robust XVA process. Following similar
arguments to those used above, the strategy will be obtained by pasting together the various quantities
associated with different subsets J of defaulted entities.
Theorem 5.10. The robust XVA can be represented explicitly by
rXVAt =
∑
J∈2{1,...,N}
Uˇ
(J),∗
t 1l{τ (J)∧τC∧τI∧T<t≤mink∈Jc τ (J)k ∧τC∧τI∧T}
(41)
+
(
θ˜C(VˆτC ,MτC−)1l{τC<minj∈Jc τ (J)j ∧τI∧T}
+ θ˜I(VˆτI ,MτI−)1l{τI<minj∈Jc τ (J)j ∧τC∧T}
)
1l{τC∧τI≤t≤T},
where the process Uˇ (J),∗t := uˇ(J),∗(T − t). Define
ξ
i,(J),∗
t =
Uˇ
(J),∗
t − Uˇ{i}∪(J),∗t
Bit−
1l{τ (J)∧τC∧τI∧T<t≤mink∈Jc τ (J)k ∧τC∧τI∧T}
, (42)
ξ
I,(J),∗
t =
LI(Vˆt −Mt−)+ + Uˇ (J),∗t
BIt−
1l{τ (J)∧τC∧τI∧T<t≤mink∈Jc τ (J)k ∧τC∧τI∧T}
,
ξ
C,(J),∗
t =
−LC(Vˆt −Mt−)− + Uˇ (J),∗t
BCt−
1l{τ (J)∧τC∧τI∧T<t≤mink∈Jc τ (J)k ∧τC∧τI∧T}
,
ξ
f,(J),∗
t =
−Uˇ (J),∗t −
∑
i∈Jc
(
Uˇ
(J),∗
t − Uˇ{i}∪(J),∗t
)
+ LC(Vˆt −Mt−)− − LI(Vˆt −Mt−)+ −Mt−
B
rf
t
× 1l{τ (J)∧τC∧τI∧T<t≤mink∈Jc τ (J)k ∧τC∧τI∧T}.
The super-replicating strategies for rXVA are obtained from the above conditional strategies as
ξi,∗t =
∑
J∈2{1,...,N}\{i}
ξ
i,(J),∗
t 1l{τ (J)∧τC∧τI∧T<t≤mink∈Jc τ (J)k ∧τC∧τI∧T}
, (43)
ξI,∗t =
∑
J∈2{1,...,N}
ξ
I,(J),∗
t 1l{τ (J)∧τC∧τI∧T<t≤mink∈Jc τ (J)k ∧τC∧τI∧T}
,
ξC,∗t =
∑
J∈2{1,...,N}
ξ
C,(J),∗
t 1l{τ (J)∧τC∧τI∧T<t≤mink∈Jc τ (J)k ∧τC∧τI∧T}
,
ξf,∗t =
∑
J∈2{1,...,N}
ξ
f,(J),∗
t 1l{τ (J)∧τC∧τI∧T<t≤mink∈Jc τ (J)k ∧τC∧τI∧T}
,
together with the number of shares held in the collateral account given by
ψm,∗t = −
Mt−
Brmt
1l{t≤τ{1,...,N}∧τC∧τI∧T}. (44)
27
Proof. The proof that rXVA dominates XVAµ for any µ
C
≤ µ ≤ µC is done in the same way as in the
proof of Theorem 5.5. To prove that the super-replicating strategy is given by equations (43) and (44),
fix J ⊂ {1, ..., N}. Then the value of the portfolio associated with this strategy at time t on the set
{τ (J) ∧ τC ∧ τI ∧ T < t < mink∈Jc τ (J)k ∧ τC ∧ τI ∧ T} is∑
i∈Jc
ξi,∗u B
i
u + ξ
I,∗
t B
I
t + ξ
C,∗
t B
C
t + ξ
f,∗
t B
rf
t − ψm,∗t Brmt
=
∑
i∈Jc
ξi,(J),∗u B
i
u + ξ
I,(J),∗
t B
I
t + ξ
C,(J),∗
t B
C
t + ξ
f,(J),∗
t B
rf
t − ψm,∗t Brmt = Uˇ∗t = Uˇ (J),∗t .
The change in the value of the portfolio on this set is∑
i∈Jc
ξi,∗u dB
i
u + ξ
I,(J),∗
t dB
I
t + ξ
C,(J),∗
t dB
C
t + ξ
f,(J),∗
t dB
rf
t − ψm,∗t dBrmt (45)
=
( ∑
i∈Jc
(rD + hQi )
(
Uˇ
(J),∗
t − Uˇ{i}∪(J),∗t
)
+
(
LI(Vˆt −Mt−)+ + Uˇ (J),∗t
)
µI
+ (−LC(Vˆt −Mt−)− + Uˇ (J),∗t )µC + rm(Mt)Mt + rf (ξf,(J),∗t )ξf,(J),∗t Brft
)
dt.
Similarly to the case of a single name credit default swap, the super-replicating strategy needs to also
include the cash flow (
rf (ξf,(J),∗t )− rD
) ∑
i∈Jc
Lidt, (46)
due to the fact that Vˆ is obtained by discounting at the rate rD, rather than rf , and hence the loss
given default rates ∑i∈Jc Lidt accrues interest at rate rD.
The change in value of the super-replicating portfolio is obtained by using equations (45) and (46),
and needs to be compared with the change in the valuation process, given by
dUˇ
(J),∗
t =
(
(rD + hQI )
(
LI(Vˆt −Mt−)+ + Uˇ (J),∗t
)− (µC)∗(Vˆt,Mt, Uˇ (J),∗t )(LC(Vˆt −Mt−)− − Uˇ (J),∗t )(47)
+
∑
k∈Jc
(rD + hQk )Uˇ
{i}∪(J),∗
t + rm(Mt)Mt + rf (ξ
f,(J),∗
t )
(
ξ
f,(J),∗
t B
rf
t +
∑
i∈Jc
Li
)
− rD
∑
i∈Jc
Li
)
dt
It then follows that (45) together with (46) dominates (47) from above because(
(µC)∗(Vˆt,Mt, Uˇ (J),∗t )− µC
) (
θ˜C(Vˆt,Mt)− Uˇ (J),∗t
) ≥ 0.
To complete the proof, it is left to consider the set {t = mink∈Jc τ (J)k ∧ τC ∧ τI ∧ T}, i.e., when t
corresponds to a default time. Assume that the reference entity defaulting at t is k0 ∈ Jc. Then,
by the definition of super-replicating strategy in (42), and specifically ξk0,(J),∗t , it follows that the
value of the super-replicating portfolio drops from Uˇ∪(J),∗t to Uˇ
{k0}∪(J),∗
t . By the induction hypothesis,
Uˇ
{k0}∪(J),∗
t ≥ Uˇ{k0}∪(J)t . Together with Theorem 5.9, it follows that on the set {τ (J) ∧ τC ∧ τI ∧ T <
t ≤ mink∈Jc τ (J)k ∧ τC ∧ τI ∧ T} the super-replicating portfolio dominates Uˇ (J)t . By summing over the
indicator sets as in (41)–(43), we get this dominance for all 0 ≤ t ≤ τC ∧ τI ∧ T .
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We expect that, as the number of reference entities increases, so does the difference between sub-
replication and super-replication valuations. This may be intuitively understood as follows. The
terminal/closeout condition of the super-replication in the case of a single reference entity matches
the terminal/closeout condition of the XVA. However, as shown in Theorem 5.10, in the case of a
credit default swap portfolio where multiple reference entities appear, the terminal/closeout of the
super-replication dominates that of the XVA. Thus, in the case of two reference entities, the termi-
nal/closeout condition includes the jump to the closeout/terminal condition for the single reference
entity case, in addition to the cash flows accumulated prior to default. It is thus expected that the
difference between the super-replication and the XVA in the case of two reference entities is greater
than the corresponding difference when the portfolio consists of a single CDS. Iterating this reason-
ing inductively, we conclude that the difference between the super-replication valuation and the XVA
grows as more CDS contracts are added to the portfolio. This highlights the importance of the pro-
posed robust approach, as opposed to the naive approach, which plugs one of the two extremes of the
counterparty’s intensity uncertainty interval into the valuation formulas.
6 Numerical Analysis
This section provides a numerical analysis to assess the monotonicity patterns of XVA and its repli-
cation strategies for a portfolio consisting of five credit default swaps. Section 6.1 sets up the default
contagion model. Section 6.2 presents the numerical results.
6.1 Default Contagion Model
We use the following specification for the defaultable intensities of reference entities, investor and her
counterparty:
hQI (t) = a10 + a121lτC≤t + a13 (1lτ1≤t + 1lτ2≤t + . . .+ 1lτN≤t)
hQC(t) = a20 + a211lτI≤t + a23 (1lτ1≤t + 1lτ2≤t + . . .+ 1lτN≤t)
hQi (t) = a30 + a311lτI≤t + a321lτC≤t + a33
(
1lτ1≤t + . . . 1lτi−1≤t + 1lτi+1≤t + . . .+ 1lτN≤t
)
.
Recall that primary quantities in our model, i.e., the return rates of the defaultable accounts µi, i ∈
{1, ..., N, I, C}, are defined from Eq. (3) as µi = hQi + rD. Notice that the above specification de-
fines a homogenous credit portfolio, i.e., the default intensities of all reference entities are identical.
These differ, however, from default intensities of the investor I and her counterparty C. The above
specification of contagion via direct credit dependence was first introduced by Jarrow and Yu (2001).
6.2 Numerical Results
Throughout the section, we use the following benchmark parameters: rD = 0.0001, N = 5, LI = 0.5,
LC = 0.5, α = 0.8, r−f = 0.05, r
+
f = 0.08, r−m = r+m = 0.0001. We set the default intensity parameters
to a10 = 0.05, a13 = 0.05, a20 = 0.05, a23 = 0.01, a30 = 0.01, a33 = 0.01. Those values are in line
with empirical estimates used by Yu (2007). We set the contractual credit default swap parameters
S = 0.02 and Li = 0.5 for i = 1, . . . , 5. Because the replication process ends at the earliest of the
investor and counterparty’s default time, the parameters a12, a21, a31, and a32 do not play any role
in the analysis. We set µ
C
= a20 + rD, and µC = a20 + rD + N ∗ a23. Throughout the section, we
perform a comparative statics analysis with respect to the account rate parameters at the initial time
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of the transaction, i.e., t = 0. We fix the maturity of the portfolio to T = 1. In all graphs, we plot the
robust XVA (denoted by “upper” in the legend and corresponding to Uˇ∗), the actual XVA (denoted
by “actual” and corresponding to Uˇ), and the best-case XVA (denoted by “lower” and corresponding
to Uˇ∗). We also plot the replication strategies for the three different computed XVAs.
Observe that the number of shares in the reference entity defaultable account used in the replication
strategy of upper, actual, and lower XVA does not need to preserve the monotonicity pattern of upper,
actual, and lower XVA (such a monotonicity pattern is violated, for example, in Figure 4). This is
because the value of ξi in Eq. (42) depends on the difference between the XVA in the state where all
five reference entities are alive and that in the state where one of the reference entities has defaulted.
6.2.1 Idiosyncratic component of counterparty’s default intensity
Figure 3 shows that as the idiosyncratic component of the counterparty’s default intensity a20 increases,
the XVA decreases in absolute value. This may be explained by the fact that, as the default of the
counterparty becomes more likely, all costs associated with the replicating portfolio (including those
from funding the position and remunerating collateral) will be incurred for a shorter period of time.
As a result the size of the XVA jump at closeout decreases, which in turn results in fewer shares of
investor and her counterparty’s defaultable account. Moreover, because the counterparty’s default
becomes more likely, the XVA for a CDS with fewer reference entities will also decrease but a slower
rate, and hence the number of shares of the reference entity account will increase (see also (42)).7
In our specific setup, the value of the CDS portfolio Vˆ0 is rather small (equal to 0.00483043), the
transaction is collateralized at 80% of its market value, and the loss given default rates of the investor
and counterparty are identical. Then, the jump to closeout value (regardless it is the investor or the
counterparty to default first) is entirely determined by the value of the replicating portfolio immediately
before the closeout time. This explains why the number of shares in the investor and counterparty’s
account is approximately the same.
6.2.2 Sensitivity of counterparty’s default intensity to portfolio credit risk
Figure 4 illustrates the dependence of XVA and replication strategies on a23, i.e., the parameter
quantifying the sensitivity of counterparty default intensity to credit risk of the underlying portfolio.
Let us start observing that the XV A is negative. Moreover, Vˆ0 is positive and small, thus θ˜C(vˆ,m)−
uˇ ≥ 0. Correspondingly, the upper XVA always uses the rate µC in the replication strategy, while
the lower XVA always uses the rate µ
C
. Notice that in our model specification the lower bond µ
C
is
independent of a23 while the upper bound µ¯C increases linearly with a23. This explains why the upper
XVA varies with a23, while the lower XVA is constant with respect to it. Consistently with the graph
in Figure 3, an increase in a23 raises the likelihood that the transaction will terminate earlier. Hence,
the financing costs of the transaction will be smaller, and the XVA decreases.
6.2.3 Sensitivity of portfolio credit risk to contagion
Figure 5 illustrates the dependence of XVA and replication strategies on a33, i.e., the parameter
quantifying the impact of credit contagion on the default risk of the reference entities in the portfolio.
To better explain the results, we also illustrate the sensitivity of Vˆ0 with respect to a33. By contrast,
7Observe that ξi must be the same for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 5} because the account rates dynamics are the same for all
reference entities.
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Figure 3: Top Left panel: XVA as a function of a20. Top Right panel: Value of a reference entity
defaultable account in the XVA replication strategy. Medium Left panel: Value of the investor de-
faultable account in the XVA replication strategy. Medium Right panel: Value of the counterparty
defaultable account in the XVA replication strategy. Bottom Left panel: Value of the funding account
in the XVA replication strategy.
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Figure 4: Top Left panel: XVA as a function of a23. Top Right panel: Value of a reference entity
defaultable account in the XVA replication strategy. Medium Left panel: Value of the investor de-
faultable account in the XVA replication strategy. Medium Right panel: Value of the counterparty
defaultable account in the XVA replication strategy. Bottom Left panel: Value of the funding account
in the XVA replication strategy.
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Figures 3 and 4 do not present a graph of Vˆ0 with respect to a20 and a23, because Vˆ0 only depends on
portfolio credit risk parameters, and is thus independent of the default intensities of investor and her
counterparty (the trading parties are not reference entities of the traded portfolio).
We start by observing that Vˆ0 is increasing in a33. This is because we view the CDS payoff from the
payer’s point of view. As the paid spread premium S is fixed, the moneyness of the contract increases
if the default risk of the portfolio increase, which is the case if direct contagion effects are stronger.
Moreover, it is easily seen from the expression (42) that ξI increases with Vˆ while ξC is decreasing in
Vˆ . Altogether, this implies the number of shares in the investor defaultable account is higher than the
corresponding number of shares in the counterparty defaultable account. From a financial perspective,
this can be understood in terms of DVA and CVA. As the investor is in the money because Vˆ > 0,
he would need to additionally replicate the DVA benefit LI(1 − α)Vˆ + at his own default time. By
contrast, the investor does not need to replicate any CVA loss at the counterparty default time because
LI(1− α)Vˆ − = 0.
The top left graph of Figure 5 highlights the prominent role played by default contagion. As a33
increases, the default intensity of all reference entities in the portfolio increases. This in turn has an
indirect effect on the default intensity of the investor and of the counterparty (through the coefficients
a13 and a23 respectively), because both intensities jump upward if any of the five reference entities
in the portfolio defaults. This indirect effect on the counterparty default intensity (magnified by a
factor equal to five, i.e., equal to the number of entities in the portfolio) is higher than the direct effect
resulting from increasing a23; compare the top left graph of Figure 5 with the corresponding graph
in Figure 4. Because of this amplification effect created by the default contagion, the replicating
strategy associated with the reference entity defaultable account take a more concave, rather than
linear, dependence on a23. This may be understood as follows: while initially, as a33 increases, the
XVA of a portfolio with five reference entities increases faster than the XVA of a portfolio with four
reference entities, eventually, as a33 becomes high enough, the contagion among the reference entities
in the portfolio is much higher than the contagion effect imposed by the default of reference entities
on the investor or her counterparty. This in turn means that if one reference entity were to default,
it is very likely that all other reference entities will default shortly after (default clustering is strong).
Thus, the XVA will be approximately the same regardless the number of reference entities in the CDS
portfolio. This induces a decrease in the number of reference entities account shares.
6.2.4 Idiosyncratic component of portfolio credit risk
As a30 increases, the idiosyncratic default risk of each portfolio reference entity is higher. This increases
the variance in the number of defaulting entities, and thus results in a larger uncertainty in the CDS
payoff. As a result the distance between lower and upper XVA increases, as confirmed from the top
left panel of Figure 6. A higher value of a30 implies higher portfolio credit risk, and thus a larger value
of Vˆ0. However, Vˆ0 is less sensitive to changes in a30 than to changes in a33. In the latter case, there
is an amplification effect due to increased contagion, whereas in the former case contagion is at fixed
level. This in turn implies that investor’s defaultable account has a smaller sensitivity to a30 than to
a33. A direct comparison of the medium left graphs of Figures 6 and 5 provides a visual confirmation
for this statement.
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Figure 5: Top Left panel: XVA as a function of a33. Top Right panel: Value of a reference entity
defaultable account in the XVA replication strategy. Medium Left panel: Value of the investor de-
faultable account in the XVA replication strategy. Medium Right panel: Value of the counterparty
defaultable account in the XVA replication strategy. Bottom Left panel: Value of the funding account
in the XVA replication strategy. Bottom Right Panel: Value of Vˆ0.
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Figure 6: Top Left panel: XVA as a function of a30. Top Right panel: Value of a reference entity
defaultable account in the XVA replication strategy. Medium Left panel: Value of the investor de-
faultable account in the XVA replication strategy. Medium Right panel: Value of the counterparty
defaultable account in the XVA replication strategy. Bottom Left panel: Value of the funding account
in the XVA replication strategy. Bottom Right Panel: Value of Vˆ0.
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7 Conclusions
We have developed a framework to calculate the robust XVA of a credit default swap portfolio. We
have considered the situation where the trader faces uncertainty on the return rate of the money
market account associated with the counterparty. The credit default swap portfolio is replicated by
the investor using defaultable accounts associated with the same entities referencing the single name
credit default swap contracts in the portfolio. By constraining the return rate of the counterparty
account to lie within an uncertainty interval, we have derived lower and upper bounds for the XVA.
Our analysis highlights a nontrivial interaction between the value process of the trade that accounts
for all financing costs, and the closeout process that depends on the clean price of the transaction.
The latter is obtained by pricing the cash flow of the trade, ignoring all other costs involved. We have
shown that the value of the super-replication is obtained by switching, possibly multiple times during
the life of the transaction, between the lower and upper bound of the account rate uncertainty interval,
depending on whether the value of the XVA replication trade lies above or below the corresponding
close-out value of the transaction. Our comparative statics analysis highlights the nontrivial role
played by credit contagion on XVA, and the corresponding replication strategies. Higher portfolio
credit risk increases the value of the underlying portfolio for the CDS payer, and results in a larger
number of reference entity account shares. If the counterparty is more sensitive to default events of
the underlying portfolio, XVA is lower because the transaction terminates earlier and is less costly to
implement.
Our framework constitutes a first step towards understanding the impact of model uncertainty on
XVA. In a future continuation of the study, we would like to explore the impact of default contagion
on gap risk, because the latter may build up during the margin period of risk due to the high volatility
of the underlying mark to market value. Prices of credit default swaps are especially affected by gap
risk, because unlike other swap contracts whose payoff is not credit sensitive (e.g. interest rate swaps),
the mark-to-market of a CDS jumps at the default time of the investor or her counterparty because of
the default correlation between reference entities and trading partes. The calculation of initial margins
should then account for such a risk. The development of an initial margins formula that takes into
account contagion effects is, however, far from trivial because of the complex dependence structure of
defaults in the underlying portfolio. We also plan to generalize our framework to deal with uncertainty
in the portfolio credit risk. While individual firms’ default probabilities may be estimated from single
name CDS spreads, default correlation is hardest to estimate and subject to model risk. We leave all
these questions for future research.
A Proofs of lemmas and propositions
Proof of Eq. (15). First, observe that the linear BSDE (14) admits the solution given by
Vˆt = Cˆ1(t) = −EQ
[∫ {τ1∧T}
t
e−rD(u−t)S1 du− L1e−rD(τ1−t)1lτ1≤T
∣∣∣∣Ft]1l{t≤τ1}.
36
Moreover, as the default distribution is characterized by Q[u ≥ τ1] = e−
∫ u
t
hQ1 (s)ds, on the same event
{t ≤ τ1} we have that
Vˆt = −EQ
[∫ T
t
1l{u≥τ1}e
−rD(u−t)S1 du−
∫ T
t
L1e
−rD(u−t)hQ1 (u)e
−
∫ u
t
hQ1 (s)dsdu
∣∣∣∣Ft]1l{t≤τ1}
= −EQ
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ u
t
(hQ1 (s)+rD)dsS1 du−
∫ T
t
L1h
Q
1 (u)e
−
∫ u
t
(hQ1 (s)+rD)dsdu
∣∣∣∣Ft]1l{t≤τ1}.
Proof of Proposition 4.6. To facilitate the no-arbitrage argument, we will express the wealth pro-
cess under a suitable measure P˜ specified via the stochastic exponential
dP˜
dP
=
∏
i∈{1,...,N,I,C}
(
(µi − r+f )(τ ∧ τ(N))∫ τ∧τ(N)
0 h
P
i (s) ds
)Hiτ
exp
(∫ τ∧τ(N)
0
r+f − µi + hPi (s) ds
)
.
By Assumption 4.4 this change of measure is well defined. Moreover, while the measure P˜ is unknown
to the investor, there is no issue with using it from an abstract point of view to rule out arbitrage. By
Girsanov’s theorem, the dynamics of the risky assets are given by
dBit = r+f B
i
t dt−Bit−d$i,P˜t
for i ∈ {1, . . . , N, I, C} where $i,P˜ := ($i,P˜t ; 0 ≤ t ≤ τ) are (G, P˜)-martingales. The r+f discounted
assets P˜ it := e
−r+
f
tBCt are thus (G, P˜)-martingales. In particular, the default intensities under P˜ are
given by hP˜i = µi − r+f , which are positive by Assumption 4.4.
Denote the wealth process associated with (Bit; i ∈ {1, . . . , N, I, C})t≥0 in the underlying market
by Vˇt. Using the self-financing condition, its dynamics are given by
dVˇt = rfξft B
rf
t dt+
∑
i∈{1,...,N,I,C}
r+f ξ
i
t dB
i
t
=
(
rfξ
f
t B
rf
t +
∑
i∈{1,...,N,I,C}
r+f ξ
i
tB
i
t
)
dt−
∑
i∈{1,...,N,I,C}
ξitB
i
t d$
i,P˜
t .
Then we observe that rfξft ≤ r+f ξft and thus
Vˇτ (ϕ, x)− Vˇ0(ϕ, x) =
∫ τ
0
(rfξft B
rf
t +
∑
i∈{1,...,N,I,C}
r+f ξ
i
tB
i
t
)
dt−
∑
i∈{1,...,N,I,C}
∫ τ
0
ξitB
i
t− d$
i,P˜
t
≤
∫ τ
0
(r+f ξ
f
t B
rf
t +
∑
i∈{1,...,N,I,C}
r+f ξ
i
tB
i
t
)
dt−
∑
i∈{1,...,N,I,C}
∫ τ
0
ξitB
i
t− d$
i,P˜
t
=
∫ τ
0
r+f Vˇt(ϕ, x) dt+
∑
i∈{1,...,N,I,C}
∫ τ
0
r+f ξ
i
t dB
i
t.
Therefore, it follows that
e−r
+
f
τ Vˇτ (ϕ, x)− Vˇ0(ϕ, x) ≤
∑
i∈{1,...,N,I,C}
∫ τ
0
r+f ξ
i
t dP˜
i
t .
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Note that the right hand side of the above inequality is a local martingale bounded from below (as the
value process is bounded from below by the admissibility condition), and therefore is a supermartingale.
Taking expectations, we conclude that
EP˜
[
e−r
+
f
τ Vˇτ (ϕ, x)− Vˇ0(ϕ, x)
] ≤ 0.
Thus either P˜
[
Vˇτ (ϕ, x) = er
+
f
τx
]
= 1 or P˜
[
Vˇτ (ϕ, x) < er
+
f
τx
]
> 0. As P˜ is equivalent to P, this shows
that arbitrage opportunities for the investor are precluded in this model (he would receive er
+
f
τx by
lending the positive cash amount x to the treasury desk at the rate r+f ).
Proof of Proposition 5.3. The existence and uniqueness of a solution to ODE (24) on the time
interval [0, T ] follows from the classical Picard-Lindelöf Theorem, together with Corollary II.3.2 of
Hartman (2001).
We now show existence and uniqueness of a solution to ODE (25). The existence again follows from
the classical Picard-Lindelöf Theorem on every continuity interval of hi’s. For simplicity of exposition
we will assume that all hi’s are continuous on [0, T ]. In case, of a discontinuity, the solution will not
be differentiable there, but will remain continuous.
First note that uˇ is bounded. To see this, observe that gˇ is Lipschitz in its second argument, and
|gˇ(t, 0; vˆ(t),m(t))| ≤ K0 is uniformly bounded, by possibly increasing the constant K0 if needed. It
thus follows that
|gˇ(t, uˇ; vˆ(t),m(t))| ≤ |gˇ(t, uˇ(t); vˆ(t),m(t))− gˇ(t, 0; vˆ(t),m(t))|+ |gˇ(t, 0; vˆ(t),m(t))| ≤ K0 |uˇ|+K0.
Then, assuming, uˇ is differentiable, we can employ Gronwall inequality and deduce that if
∂tuˇ(t) ≤ K0uˇ(t) +K0,
uˇ(0) = 0,
then uˇ(t) ≤ K1 := K0TeK0T , for t ∈ [0, T ]. Similar for the lower bound, if
∂tuˇ(t) ≥ −K0uˇ(t)−K0
uˇ(0) = 0,
from which it follows that uˇ(t) ≥ −K1.
We would have been done, if not for the assumption of differentiability needed for the Gronwall
inequality. Fortunately, by the classical Picard-Lindelöf Theorem the solution to eq. (18) exists on
some interval [0, T0),×[−K1 − 1,K1 + 1] that is for t ∈ [0, T0) it holds that |uˇ(t)| ≤ K1 + 1, and it is
unique there. This time, we are guaranteed differentiability. Assume by contradiction that it cannot
be extended (to the right) beyond T0 and that T0 < T (the same argument applies, if T0 = T , but the
solution cannot be extended to the closed interval [0, T ]). Then by Corollary II.3.2 of Hartman (2001)
we have that lim
t→T0
|uˇ(t)| = K1 + 1. We now reach a contradiction, by employing Gronwall inequality
argument above that shows that |uˇ| ≤ K1.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. As the filtration F is trivial, the F-BSDE is in fact an ODE. The existence
and uniqueness to this ODE is shown in Proposition 5.3. The equivalence of the full G-BSDEs and the
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reduced F-BSDEs follows from the projection result (Crépey and Song, 2015, Theorem 4.3) as condition
(A) in their paper is satisfied by our assumptions on the filtrations and their Condition (J) is also
satisfied (as the terminal condition does not depend on Z˜, Z˜I and Z˜C). Finally, by the martingale
representation theorems with respect to F and G (see (Bielecki and Rutkowski, 2001, Section 5.2); their
required assumptions are satisfied because our intensities are bounded), the solution of our BSDEs
and those of the martingale problems considered in Crépey and Song (2015) coincide.
Proof of Theorem 5.4. First, note that similar to the proof of Proposition 5.3, the functions uˇ∗ and
uˇ∗, defined as the solutions to the ODEs in (26) exist and are unique. This follows from the fact that
the functions g∗ and g∗ are Lipschitz continuous in all arguments.
Assume, by contradiction, that there exists T0 ≤ T for which uˇ∗(T0) < uˇ(T0), and set T1 =
sup {t ≤ T0|uˇ∗(t) ≥ uˇ(t)} . We have that T1 is well defined, and T1 ≥ 0, because uˇ∗(0) = uˇ(0) = 0 and
uˇ∗(t) < uˇ(t) for t ∈ (T1, T0). Using the facts that µC > rD and that (µ
Q
C)∗(vˆ,m, uˇ)(θ˜C(vˆ,m) − uˇ) ≥
µQC(t)(θ˜C(vˆ,m)− uˇ) for any t ∈ [0, T ], we have that
∂tuˇ
∗(T1) = g∗(T1, uˇ∗; vˆ,m)
= hQI
(
θ˜I(vˆ(T1),m(T1))− uˇ∗(T1)
)− hQ1 uˇ∗(T1)
+ ((µC)∗(vˆ(T1),m(T1), uˇ∗(T1))− rD)
(
θ˜C(vˆ(T1),m(T1))− uˇ∗(T1)
)
+ f˜
(
T1, uˇ
∗(T1),−uˇ∗(T1), θ˜I(vˆ(T1),m(T1))− uˇ∗(T1), θ˜C(vˆ(T1),m(T1))− uˇ∗; vˆ(T1),m(T1)
)
≥ hQI
(
θ˜I(vˆ(T1),m(T1))− uˇ∗(T1)
)
+ hQC(T1)
(
θ˜C(vˆ(T1),m(T1))− uˇ∗(T1)
)− hQ1 uˇ∗(T1)
+ f˜
(
T1, uˇ
∗(T1),−uˇ∗(T1), θ˜I(vˆ(T1),m(T1))− uˇ∗(T1), θ˜C(vˆ(T1,m(T1)))− uˇ∗; vˆ(T1),m(T1)
)
= gˇ(T1, uˇ; vˆ(T1),m(T1))dt = ∂tuˇ(T1).
It follows that there exists an  > 0, such that uˇ∗(t) ≥ uˇ(t) for t ∈ [T1, T1 + ]. This contradicts the
assumption, and proves the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5.9. The proof of the super-replicating strategies is done by induction over |J |,
i.e., the cardinality of J . Without loss of generality, we may assume γ ∈ {1,−1}. We present the proof
for γ = 1, as this is identical to the case γ = −1. For notational convenience, we drop the superscript
γ. If |J | = N − 1, the thesis follows directly from Theorem 5.5. By induction over the cardinality
of |J |, assume that the result holds in case of when the entities in the set J have not defaulted yet,
with |J | = n+ 1 ≥ 1. Next, we prove the result for the case when the set J of entities that have not
defaulted yet has cardinality n. Fix such a set J for which |J | = n.
Assume, by contradiction, that there exists T0 ≤ T for which uˇ(J),∗(T0) < uˇ(T0), and set T1 =
sup
{
t ≤ T0|uˇ(J),∗(t) ≥ uˇ(t)
}
. Then, T1 is well defined, and T1 ≥ 0 since uˇ(J),∗(0) = uˇ(0) = 0
and uˇ(J),∗(t) < uˇ(t) for t ∈ (T1, T0). Denote Zf,(J),∗ = ∑k∈Jc uˇ{k}∪J,∗ − (|Jc| + 1)uˇ(J),∗(T1) +
θ˜I(vˆ(T1),m(T1)) + θ˜C(vˆ(T1),m(T1)) +
∑
k∈Jc Lk −Mt, and similarly, Zf,(J) =
∑
k∈Jc uˇ{k}∪J − (|Jc|+
1)uˇ(J),∗(T1) + θ˜I(vˆ(T1),m(T1)) + θ˜C(vˆ(T1),m(T1)) +
∑
k∈Jc Lk −Mt.
Using the facts that µ
C
> rD and that (µQC)∗(vˆ,m, uˇ)(θ˜C(vˆ,m)− uˇ) ≥ µQC(t)(θ˜C(vˆ,m)− uˇ) for any
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t ∈ [0, T ] we have that
∂tuˇ
(J),∗ = g∗
(
T1, uˇ
(J),∗,
∑
k∈Jc
uˇ{k}∪J,∗,
∑
k∈Jc
hQk uˇ
{k}∪J,∗; vˆ(J),m, J
)
= hQI (T1)
(
θ˜I(vˆ(T1),m(T1))− uˇ(J),∗(T1)
)
+
∑
i∈Jc
hQi
(
uˇ{i}∪(J),∗(T1)− uˇ(J),∗(T1)
)
+ ((µC)∗(vˆ(T1),m(T1), uˇ(J),∗(T1))− rD)
(
θ˜C(vˆ(T1),m(T1))− uˇ(J),∗(T1)
)
+ f˜
(
T1, uˇ
(J),∗(T1),
∑
k∈Jc
uˇ{k}∪J,∗ − |Jc| uˇ(J),∗(T1), θ˜I(vˆ(T1),m(T1))− uˇ(J),∗(T1),
θ˜C(vˆ(T1),m(T1))− uˇ(J),∗; vˆ(T1),m(T1), J
)
= hQI (T1)
(
θ˜I(vˆ(T1),m(T1))− uˇ(J),∗(T1)
)−∑
i∈Jc
hQi uˇ
(J),∗(T1)
+ ((µC)∗(vˆ(T1),m(T1), uˇ(J),∗(T1))− rD)
(
θ˜C(vˆ(T1),m(T1))− uˇ(J),∗(T1)
)− rf (Zf,(J),∗)Zf,(J),∗
+
∑
k∈Jc
(
hQi + rD
)
uˇ{i}∪(J),∗(T1)
+ rD
(
−(|Jc|+ 2)uˇ(J),∗(T1) + θ˜I(vˆ(T1),m(T1)) + θ˜C(vˆ(T1),m(T1))
)
− rm(Mt)Mt + rD
∑
k∈Jc
Lk
≥ hQI (T1)
(
θ˜I(vˆ(T1),m(T1))− uˇ(J),∗(T1)
)−∑
i∈Jc
hQi uˇ
(J),∗(T1)
+ ((µC)∗(vˆ(T1),m(T1), uˇ(J),∗(T1))− rD)
(
θ˜C(vˆ(T1),m(T1))− uˇ(J),∗(T1)
)− rf (Zf,(J))Zf,(J)∗
+
∑
k∈Jc
(
hQi + rD
)
uˇ{i}∪(J),∗(T1)
+ rD
(
−(|Jc|+ 2)uˇ(J),∗(T1) + θ˜I(vˆ(T1),m(T1)) + θ˜C(vˆ(T1),m(T1))
)
− rm(Mt)Mt + rD
∑
k∈Jc
Lk
= hQI (T1)
(
θ˜I(vˆ(T1),m(T1))− uˇ(J),∗(T1)
)−∑
i∈Jc
hQi uˇ
(J),∗(T1)
+ ((µC)∗(vˆ(T1),m(T1), uˇ(J),∗(T1))− rD)
(
θ˜C(vˆ(T1),m(T1))− uˇ(J),∗(T1)
)
− rf (Zf,(J))
(
−(|Jc|+ 1)uˇ(J),∗(T1) + θ˜I(vˆ(T1),m(T1)) + θ˜C(vˆ(T1),m(T1)) +
∑
k∈Jc
Lk −Mt
)
+
∑
k∈Jc
(
hQi + rD − rf (Zf,(J))
)
uˇ{i}∪(J),∗(T1)
+ rD
(
−(|Jc|+ 2)uˇ(J),∗(T1) + θ˜I(vˆ(T1),m(T1)) + θ˜C(vˆ(T1),m(T1))
)
− rm(Mt)Mt + rD
∑
k∈Jc
Lk
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≥ hQI (T1)
(
θ˜I(vˆ(T1),m(T1))− uˇ(J),∗(T1)
)−∑
i∈Jc
hQi uˇ
(J),∗(T1)
+ hQC
(
θ˜C(vˆ(T1),m(T1))− uˇ(J),∗(T1)
)
− rf (Zf,(J))
(
−(|Jc|+ 1)uˇ(J),∗(T1) + θ˜I(vˆ(T1),m(T1)) + θ˜C(vˆ(T1),m(T1)) +
∑
k∈Jc
Lk −Mt
)
+
∑
k∈Jc
(
hQi + rD − rf (Zf,(J))
)
uˇ{i}∪(J)(T1)
+ rD
(
−(|Jc|+ 2)uˇ(J),∗(T1) + θ˜I(vˆ(T1),m(T1)) + θ˜C(vˆ(T1),m(T1))
)
− rm(Mt)Mt + rD
∑
k∈Jc
Lk
= gˇ(T1, uˇ; vˆ(T1),m(T1))dt = ∂tuˇ(T1).
The first inequality above follows from the following inequality rf (Zf,(J))Zf,(J)∗ ≥ rf (Zf,(J),∗)Zf,(J)∗.
To deduce the second inequality above, we have used that r−f , r
+
f < mini∈{1,...N,I} µi∧µC , and the
induction hypothesis for sets of cardinality n+ 1. This implies that there exists a constant  > 0, such
that uˇ∗(t) ≥ uˇ(t) for t ∈ [T1, T1 + ]. This leads to a contradiction, and hence the theorem is proven.
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